The Infantry School QUARTERLY

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THE INFANTRY SCHOOL Q

JANUARY 1953

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

Letters to the Editor

WHAT TO EXPECT?

Sir:

As a second lieutenant who can expect those FEC orders any day now, I am concerned about some of the holes in my training for combat in Korea.

Undoubtedly I'll be a platoon leader over there. And, whether a real war begins or a shadow war continues, I'll be going on a lot of patrols.

I'm pretty well set on what I do, and what I have my men do on a patrol, but I'd like to know more about what I can expect the enemy to do.

Specifically, these are my questions:

1. Does the enemy attempt many ambushes of our patrols?

2. Where are favorite places for ambushes?

3. Does he set them up in a particular manner?

Will you fill me in on any other useful information?

Sincerely yours,
2d Lt, Infantry

• We believe that if you *expect* any enemy to do *almost anything* you won't be running into surprises. You know that an ambush is a surprise attack, from a hidden position, on a moving or temporarily stationary enemy, with the mission of capturing or killing him. Your patrol fits the bill as a suitable victim and you can expect that our enemies in Korea or anywhere else will attempt to ambush your patrols, wire repair crews, sentinels, vehicular convoys, and columns of foot troops. Anytime a unit uses the same route repeatedly, or performs similar missions on a fixed time schedule, it can very well expect an ambush. One of the best ways to avoid an ambush is by the skillful use of security measures.

We can very well answer your specific questions by one statement familiar to the services, "It depends on the situation."

QUESTION 1. Does the enemy attempt many ambushes of our patrols?

ANSWER: Some Korean returnees report no enemy ambushes at all, and yet others will tell of numerous instances in which this form of combat patrol was used against us. The actions of the enemy will vary from one period to another or from one sector to another. The enemy's missions, the terrain, the condition

and number of their troops and equipment, and even the personalities of their local commanders will determine their actions.

QUESTIONS 2 & 3. Where are favorite places for ambushes? Does he set them up in a particular manner?

ANSWERS: When they used ambushes, they were set up primarily along heavily travelled roads and trails either at bends or in narrow defiles. They will frequently know when you're going to pass a selected area either through long range observation or through your habit of using it at a certain time. They have even used civilians, under threat of death, to guide our units into the selected ambush area. An innocent-looking group of farmers has on occasion eliminated an unsuspecting patrol.

Being particularly adept at camouflage, the enemy has used this asset in enabling him to set up successful ambushes.

Battle Indoctrination Courses

Sir:

This Headquarters has been given the mission of constructing and conducting all Battle Indoctrination Courses for the 31st Infantry Division.

We have received a considerable amount of helpful information from Capt Nicholson's "Small Arms Fire Course" in the July QUARTERLY. and find it desirable to have the other Battle Indoctrination articles for planning purposes.

Request "The Village," which appeared in the April QUARTERLY, and if possible, any information you might have on the Attack, Infiltration and Close Combat Courses.

Also request that a subscription be entered for this unit in my name.

RICHARD E. ADAMS
Lt Colonel, Armor
Commanding, Headquarters 198th Tank Bn (Med)
31st Infantry Division

• Lt Colonel Adams' letter is typical of a number we receive. In this case we forwarded him a complimentary copy of the April QUARTERLY as well as a file copy of "Realism" (which appears in this issue). In addition we sent the colonel's letter to those agencies here at The Infantry School which we felt might be of assistance.

Lt Colonel Adam's letter points up several things we feel important. You see we regard the QUARTERLY as a reader service. Why? — Because most of our articles can, with very little revision, be used as conferences or, in the case of the Battle Indoctrination Series, as guides for setting up Battle Indoctrination Courses.

We hasten to add that the 198th Tank Battalion is now on the QUARTERLY subscription list.

— *Editor*

Address all letters to: The Editor, Infantry School Quarterly, Training Publications Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Editors Page

To Our Readers:

"Would you be interested in an article based on my experiences as a heavy weapons company commander?" wrote the captain. The captain, now stationed in Japan, but late of Korea, wanted to be certain. We promptly replied with an emphatic, resounding yes.

After posting our reply we fell into a discussion of the relative merits of written combat experiences. The staff agreed (and we believe you will too) that the Infantry is the loser when such experiences are cached away in some forgotten corner of our minds and consequently remain unpublished. It was conceded, in the course of our discussion, that we will not all agree with the lessons learned or the action taken in every such experience. However, we concluded that disagreement frequently gives birth to serious thought—and what is more valuable to the Army than a thinking Infantryman?

So why not put your article ideas into action by dropping us a note. And don't forget—we pay for published articles.

The Infantry School and the Quarterly staff wish each of you, wherever you may be—
a SUCCESSFUL 1953.

The Editor



You recognize this picture—the bunkers, the snow and the bleak hill—as a scene from Korea. This issue of the Quarterly was prepared with such a scene in mind. We hope that in each article there will be something—an idea, a lesson or thought—that will contribute toward increasing the combat effectiveness of the Infantryman pictured and either directly or indirectly make each man's job an easier one.


Don't Forget The Fundamentals
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
RIFLE COMPANY INFANTRY REGIMENT
Gen. J. Lawton Collins

✔ Organization and Attack

✔ Terrain Analysis

✔ Maneuver

THE Infantry Quarterly is a splendid medium for reaching our infantry officers, and I want to take this opportunity to discuss with you a few observations I have made during recent inspection trips. While I was generally pleased with what I saw, nevertheless there are a few fundamentals which I wish to re-emphasize. I know our officers and noncoms have heard them many times in one form or another; however, I have encountered violations of these basic concepts from time to time in small unit training problems. Since we will continue to have a great Army only if we continue to produce superior small units — and I mean superior squads and platoons — I want to stress these fundamentals primarily for our junior leaders today who will be our senior commanders tomorrow.

My observations may be summarized into three general areas:

First, we need to stress more adequately the close links between our doctrine of attack and the principles of our Army organization.

Second, we need to emphasize more strongly the importance of terrain analysis.

Third, because not enough attention is being paid to the first two areas, we have a tendency to make costly frontal attacks.

It is my purpose here to re-emphasize the simple principles behind our concept of attack and our concept of organization and the close relationship between these concepts and the analysis of terrain. I want to tie these things together by a connecting thread so that they will be more easily understood.

If we analyze any attack, we find there are certain things which must normally be done, irrespective of the size of the unit. These things fall into phases, which I like to refer to as the "four 'F's' ": "find 'em and fix 'em," "fight 'em" and "finish 'em."

The first thing we must do, if we are not immediately in contact with the enemy, is to seek him out and pin him down in position with firepower — "find 'em and fix 'em." This is really one operation as I regard it, not two. We must know who our opponent is and where he is. We also want to hold him in place and keep him occupied so as to enable us to carry out the rest of our plan of attack. This finding and fixing normally requires one of the elements available to the commander.

While we have the enemy located and pinned down, we will have to maneuver against one or another of his flanks or, if he is widely dispersed, it may be more

effective to hit him in the middle. In the average case, however, we will maneuver around one flank or the other, so we need a second element in our force — a maneuvering element — for this "fight 'em" phase.

Then in the final phase we must drive home the attack, capitalizing on the envelopment or extending the envelopment in order to "finish 'em." This final phase may require the use of the third element, the reserve, or in simple terms — our ace - in - the - hole. Sometimes, however, the maneuvering element may be able to finish the enemy and the reserve need not be committed.

These three elements must be organized alike, for one time we may use one of them for the "finding and fixing" mission, the next time we may use the same element for the maneuvering or "fighting" force, and another time it may be in reserve ready to "finish 'em." In other words, the three elements must be interchangeable, and, consequently, their organization must be the same.

The final element we need is firepower — heavy firepower which can be shifted without shifting a lot of men and weapons. We need a fire support unit, as I like to term it, to give us the fire superiority which will permit us to close with the enemy and defeat him.

The size of the units involved does not change the concept — the principles are the same whether the unit is a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, or a division. In practically all attacks the troop leader will normally be doing the things I have described: he will have to find and fix the enemy with an element which leads into the attack; he will have to maneuver against him; he will have to drive home the attack, possibly by using his reserve; and, of course, he will have to guard himself all the while with proper flank and rear security.

When his maneuver force is in position to make its assault, the full combat power of the attacking unit is then brought to bear. Thus, the final assault is the coordinated and combined effort of the holding element, the maneuvering element, the fire support unit and, if needed, the reserve.

That, in simple terms, is the essence of our entire concept of attack. Those are the basic principles from which our Army organization stems. The proper formations to use, the proper weapons to employ in fire support, exactly who will make the final assault and when — such matters as these must be decided on the spot after considering the particular factors involved, but the decisions must always be based upon the fundamentals I have outlined.

We have incorporated this general theory of attack into our organization so that we have what we call the "triangular concept" of organization — three elements constituted alike. Each unit has a finding and fixing force, a maneuvering force, and a reserve, each interchangeable with the others.

There are three rifle squads in a platoon; three rifle platoons in a company; three rifle companies in a battalion; and so on up to three regiments in a division. And

in addition to these three similar elements there is a fire support element in each unit to enable the commander to shift firepower without shifting men and weapons. In the platoon the fire support element is the weapons squad; in the company it is the weapons platoon; in the battalion it is the heavy weapons company, and so on up the line until in the division it is the division artillery. At practically all levels, certainly from the battalion up, it may be supplemented by armor, other artillery, and tactical air support.

This is the basic infantry organization that has been evolved to meet the needs of our doctrine of attack.

This organization is of tremendous advantage not only because of its soundness but also because of the ease with which a new officer can understand it. If an officer once understands the theory of how to fight a platoon, he then understands the principles for commanding a company, a battalion, a division, or an army, because there is no change in theory whatever. The one difference is that the distances involved are greater and consequently the logistical problem changes, but the tactical problem remains identically the same regardless of the size of the unit.

The basic concept of attack I have described — leading into the attack and holding with one element, maneuvering with another, and finishing up with a reserve — is nothing new, but we must continue to stress its simplicity and soundness in all our training. It must be put across for all to understand.

This concept gives every one of you, as commanders, a great opportunity to be flexible in your planning, in your use of formations, and in your orders. Don't tie yourself to any fixed or stereotyped formation, but rather keep yourself ready for anything — ready to catch the enemy by surprise through maneuver, ready to feint, ready to counter an enemy thrust, or ready to slam home a knock-out blow at the opportune moment. Don't commit yourself too early. Adjust yourself to the situation which develops before you.

By feeling out the enemy carefully with only one element, by avoiding costly frontal attacks, by capitalizing on maximum surprise through maneuver, and by keeping your reserve protected under cover until the opportune moment — away from needless exposure to fire — you, as commanders, can avoid subjecting your men to unnecessary casualties.

In brief, I want our commanders of all ranks to avoid any stereotyped form of attack. I am anxious for them to use economy of force in the initial phases of attack and to seek advantage through maneuver wherever possible. I want them to cut down the exposure factor in attack. And I want our commanders to use our organization to advantage in attack.

I also want to ensure that each of the 750,000 new men coming into the Army this year understands these principles to the fullest. It is vitally important for each individual in our tactical organizations, soldier and officer alike, to learn and understand from the very beginning the fundamentals of our concept of attack — funda-

mentals which are the reasons for our triangular organization. Each must know how the various elements of our tactical units are normally employed. And our more experienced leaders of both large and small units must continue to be impressed with the importance of the tactical principles I have described and must follow them in training and in combat.

The next major point which I want to emphasize is the careful analysis and use of terrain.

As a general concept, a commander must seize the dominant terrain if he expects to impose his will upon the enemy. By dominant terrain I mean high ground, not hollows; ridge lines, not ravines; mountain ranges, not marshlands. Of course, there will be exceptions when logistical factors or the need for communications centers or room to maneuver overrides. But, in general, the man who gets the high ground first, gains victory at the cheapest cost in men and material.

Terrain analysis is particularly important in determining where the major effort is to be made, which, to me, always ought to be in maneuver. After careful analysis has been made, the tactical plan should use the terrain to carry the operation further.

High ground and other key terrain features must be seized and u s e d b e f o r e we can hope for success. Attacks to secure dominating terrain should generally be made along the ridge lines running into the dominating position and not up the draws or ravines leading into the position. By attacking up the ridge lines, the attacker gains successively higher ground for observation and for the location of his fire support unit.

Zones of action for smaller units or sectors indicated by boundaries between units and organizations must be established in such a manner as to favor maneuver and to ensure that the dominating terrain or any other key feature, like a village, lies well within the boundaries of a single unit. If the boundary between two battalions is a ridge line which in itself is dominating terrain, obviously the responsibility for the ridge is not clear.

Failure to grasp the fundamentals I have described is responsible, in my judgment, for common errors I have observed.

First, there is the mistaken idea that fire superiority is gained solely by riflemen — caused by a lack of understanding of our fundamentals of organization. Of course, I appreciate the importance of the role played by riflemen, but their primary job is not to gain fire superiority. Their primary job is to kill the individual enemy by accurate fire. Rifle fire contributes, particularly at the close-in ranges, but as a general rule, fire superiority is gained by the skillful use of the fire support unit or other support available and appropriate such as artillery, armor, or air — in conjunction with the fire of the holding or maneuvering elements. While our artillery, armor, or our air support cannot do the job alone, neither can our riflemen.

Another pitfall, created by our junior leaders who do not fully understand our principles of attack and the vital importance of terrain, is the tendency to depend upon the frontal attack instead of

maneuvering around the flanks of enemy positions. Frontal attacks must be avoided wherever possible. They are costly and do not make full use of the tools available to the commander.

Now I would like to describe a problem which I saw not long ago while inspecting one of our divisions in training. Figure 1 shows the terrain involved. It consisted of a semi-circular sort of ridge with saddles as shown. The ridge had been designated as the left flank boundary for the company involved in this particular problem — the boundary ran right down through the middle of it. The objective was the hill at the north end of the ridge and the line of departure was at the southern end.

I asked myself this question as I watched: "If a company commander is to be tested in a problem s u c h as t h i s, w h y in the world should a piece of terrain like this be used to hem the poor fellow in so that he cannot maneuver, so that all he can do is make a frontal attack uphill against an objective with the enemy dug in and with all this open country in between?"

What did this company commander do? He put two platoons in the attack; he put his fire support unit in a good location on high ground behind the line of departure, as he should have; and then he moved his two forward platoons in a frontal attack up against that ridge. Of course, in actual combat his force would have been badly mauled.

Now let's take exactly that same situation and see what kind of a problem we can get out of it by a little shift. The thing that is basically wrong is that nobody is responsible for the capture of the main ridge on the left flank. As the problem was previously set up, with the ridge partly in the zones of action of two different companies, each company could have given as an excuse for not taking the ridge, "Well, the other company was going to take it."

If the company in the problem went into the woods shown on the sketch, and had the woods happened to be in Korea, with Chinese Communists sitting on the ridge to the west, what would have happened to our company? Obviously, it would have suffered heavy casualties.

All that has to be done to make a good problem out of this situation is to move the battalion left boundary so that the whole ridge line on the left is in the zone of action of the one company involved in this problem.

The problem is now sound and a fair test. The company commander in this case has two alternatives, as I see it, in making the attack. He can make his major effort generally down the ridge line, or he can take a chance down the road with a hook against the objective from the east, although I don't think this would succeed as well. The last thing he should do is to make his major effort straight across the open g r o u n d and uphill against the enemy.

If the company commander had used his head, as I think he would have done if he had been given a chance, he would have thrown one platoon, and only one, into the action initially to find and fix —



Figure 1.

to learn whether the enemy has anything in the woods to the front. A part of the finding and fixing force should do this in order to make the enemy disclose himself. That's the way to find the enemy. Then, if possible, he should be pinned down with fire.

I believe the company commander would have told the second platoon leader, "Now, you're the fellow who's going to win the fight for us. You've got to take that lower ridge first, that little knoll, (Hill 'A' shown on figure 1) so that I can advance my fire support unit from here as rapidly as possible. Then when you have reached that knoll I want you to drive with everything you've got down that ridge line so as to hit the enemy's right flank. And if the enemy moves against you, I'll have the third platoon following your platoon at 300 yards, staying concealed as long as possible.

"When you are fully engaged, the third platoon will be prepared to move around your left so that we can hit the enemy again on his right flank and rear if necessary.

"The fire support unit from initial positions on the hill just back of the line of departure will support the finding and fixing element and also be prepared to support the maneuvering element. But I don't want any firing over there on the flank (toward Hill 'A') for a while unless it is absolutely necessary, because the whole idea is going to be to get the enemy to concentrate on these woods in front of us. Then just as soon as Hill 'A' is captured I want the fire support unit to echelon over there; at least half of it, so that it can provide flanking fire during the assault on Hill 'B'."

After the company commander had given the necessary orders to the commanders of the reserve and weapons platoons, I believe he would also have ordered the platoon leader of the first platoon not to move his unit across the open space beyond the woods until a signal had been given that Hill "A" had been taken. The first platoon should not be ordered forward until its attack could be coordinated with the assault of the maneuver platoon and the fire of the fire support unit. That is requisite coordination.

Needless to say, the company commander would arrange with his battalion commander for artillery and mortar fire, and would also arrange to have a forward observer in position to make the fire most effective. In other words, the company commander should not attempt to gain fire superiority over the enemy solely by shooting a lot of rifles at him. He must rely primarily on his heavy support weapons — mortars, artillery, armor and, if necessary, air, in order to pound the life out of the objective just before driving home the final attack.

Now, is not that a vastly different problem from the one that was actually given to that poor company commander? That is an example of what we do at Fort Benning. Whenever we put on a problem we always give the unit being tested room to maneuver; we never hem it in. I repeat: Let's teach maneuver.

The situation I have described is a perfect example of the close relationship between maneuver and

terrain. With the boundary moved as I have outlined, the company commander is then logically held entirely responsible for capturing a particular piece of terrain — instead of being held only partially responsible for it.

I recently came across another situation which portrays vividly my point that the simple principles of our tactical doctrine are not getting down to many of our junior leaders. The situation involved the action of a young officer who was conducting a troop leading exercise from a sand table before a group of noncommissioned officers (see Figure 2).

The thing that impressed me most about this young officer's performance was that he paid no attention to an analysis of the terrain. He was handling a company problem, and he outlined it to his students in this manner: "First of all you are the company commander. You've come up here to Ridge W and you've gotten your orders that this is your line of departure. You are going to pass through another company that's already in position on Ridge W and that's the objective, Hill Z. Now you make a tentative plan of operation. This is a convenient point for an OP up on this hill back of the line of departure. You decide that you are going to put two platoons in the attack, the first platoon to take the right half of Z from the boulder to the east, and the second platoon to take the left half of Z. You will hold one platoon in reserve, and you are going to have your fire support weapons on this hill."

Then the young officer went right ahead talking in great detail about specific arrangements for such things as the movement of the unit forward, the reconnaissance, etc. — nothing but sheer gobbledegook insofar as his men were concerned. He paid no attention to the analysis of terrain — to deciding what was actually the best way to capture the objective. He was doing the same old thing that I have seen so many others do — split the objective in two and attack with two platoons abreast, put a platoon in reserve, and put the fire support in the rear. He missed completely the meat of the whole problem — the necessary analysis of the terrain and the use of that analysis in the development of his plan of attack.

In analyzing the terrain and the situation which this young officer faced, the first thing that came to my mind was that the objective was a rather large hill which had open approaches, as shown on the sketch, and which had a fairly steep slope leading up from the road shown at its base. I thought to myself, "Well, before I can take the objective, I certainly must capture the smaller hill (X) which lies between me and my objective. Right now I don't know whether the enemy is on there or not. After I take Hill X, am I going to make a frontal attack against the objective? I certainly will not, if I can help it. How, then, can I maneuver?

"What about trying to work down the stream to the right? To do that, I certainly must get this little knob (Y) near the bridge if it's not in the adjacent company's zone of action — or, if it is, I am going to ask that company commander to be sure to capture it


500 YARDS
OBJECTIVE
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Figure 2.

for me.

"I am certainly not going to commit too much down this draw until I know these two high points (Hill X and Knoll Y) are secure. If I can work my maneuvering platoon down along the stream to a point somewhere along the east slope of the ridge which is my objective, then I can sweep up the ridge from the more gradually sloping ground on that flank instead of storming frontally right up against the enemy.

"So I'll use one of my platoons to start forward from the line of departure and take Hill X, cleaning up any resistance which may be in between. My maneuvering platoon isn't going to do any shooting at all if they can get away with it. They are going to move along the stream line under cover, quietly and attracting as little attention as they can, until they can start their attack from the flank of the objective.

"My other rifle platoon will be in reserve. I don't want to expose it any sooner than necessary, so I will have it stay back of our line of departure until Knoll Y on my right is taken. Then I will have the reserve follow the maneuvering platoon and be prepared either to pass through the maneuvering platoon if it gets stuck or continue the envelopment around back of the objective to hit the enemy in the rear.

"That reserve platoon must also be alert to the possibility of a counterattack against the right flank of the maneuvering force.

"After making plans for my three basic elements — my rifle platoons — I still have to make use of my fire support unit. There is only one place to put the fire support unit initially and that is on Ridge W. Then later it can echelon forward to Hill X and Knoll Y.

"To finish up my fire support plan, I also want to arrange for artillery and mortar support, so I will ask my battalion commander what I can get along those lines. And I don't want my men charging across this open area without some smoke. If they do, our casualties are going to be too great."

So, that is about the way I would plan this particular attack. I would lead off with one platoon to secure Hill X to hold the enemy's attention and to pin him down; maneuver with another platoon, which will not fight or shoot unless forced to do so, until it can get into a flanking position; put another platoon in reserve generally to back up my maneuvering platoon; and use my fire support unit to assist in gaining fire superiority in conjunction with the supporting artillery. The fire support unit should be prepared to move forward from the area of the line of departure to Hill X as soon as it is captured.

By all means, I would want our artillery and mortars to know at all times where my maneuvering platoon is.

If my mortars, machine guns, and supporting artillery could not gain fire superiority, I would then call for air support. I believe it is important that we make our junior commanders aware of air support capabilities even in small unit exercises such as these. But we want them to be sure that they make full use of their own fire

support weapons which are always available, including the division artillery.

The solution I have offered in this particular problem is not necessarily the only one. You might have done much better a different way.

By no means do I think we are getting stereotyped when I say that you should, as a general rule, initiate your attack with one unit doing the finding and fixing, with another unit doing the enveloping, and with a third unit in reserve.

Do you envelop the right flank, the left flank, or do you punch the middle? Normally you should envelop one flank or the other, perhaps both flanks under certain conditions. Costly frontal attacks should be avoided wherever possible.

The terrain should always be carefully analyzed and used to advantage, and the analysis should be tied closely to our principles of attack and organization. I repeat there is nothing stereotyped about that concept.

When I go out in the field to inspect, I want to see, in particular, what the platoons, companies and battalions are doing, tactically. If an officer doesn't know how to command a battalion, he can never command a regiment, or a division, or an army. If he can command a battalion he can command anything, because a battalion commander has essentially everything in his command that an army commander has.

If we will train good platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders, I will guarantee that we will have good divisions and a good Army as well.

Changes and revisions to FMs 7-10, 7-20 and 7-40 will place added emphasis on our triangular concepts of attack and organization and the inseparable relationship of these concepts to proper terrain analysis, the plan of maneuver and plan of supporting fires. These changes will clearly show that our present triangular concept of organization gives us the capability of meeting any type of enemy action or unexpected situation that may arise on the battlefield. In addition The Infantry School is stressing these important factors during periods of resident instruction and practical work in the field.

THEY CALLED IT *Ingenuity*



LT. M. J. KILLINGSWORTH

✓ 200 men . . . 4 mortars . . .

and a training mission

"I DON'T SUPPOSE I'm the only one who ever had the problem of teaching men to lay mortars parallel with an aiming circle when you're short of 4.2-inch mortars and the M-59 sight?" I said to the captain.

The captain smiled and replied, "No, lieutenant, you're not. Sometimes I believe we have shortages around training divisions just to encourage ingenuity."

This conversation took place while I was with the Crew Served Weapons Committee at the 8th Division, down at Fort Jackson, S.C.

You see, I was assigned to the 4.2-inch mortar section. The problem was that we often had only four mortars for use in instructing two hundred men. I felt that no matter how hard I tried the men weren't getting the kind of instruction they needed — or for that matter deserved. Yes, I know that we had good conferences and bang-up demonstrations, but with Korea sort of winking at me, I felt a deep kinship with practical work. Since many of the men we were training also had Korea on their minds, I figured that in spite of equipment shortages we had to develop some device that would solve the problem.

My fellow committee members, and particularly Corporal Basil Clark and Corporal James Barge of the Division Artillery Regimental Training Committee, were of tremendous assistance. After some experimenting we came up with a device (Figure 1) that's so simple it can be constructed in a few hours and costs only $1.84. The materials used were all Army products — a caliber .50 cartridge, the small plywood disk that is used in packing 3.5-inch rocket ammunition, and a few bolts.

This device effectively takes the place of a 4.2-inch mortar and M-59 sight.* It carries out the purpose for which it was designed: the laying of the platoon parallel with an aiming circle, clearly showing the relationship of the 0-3200 line of the aiming circle to the mortar barrel.

And now let's discuss how the device is actually built. First it is made in five parts. To simplify matters I will label each part — A, B, C, D and E.

Description

1. Part A (Figure 2) represents the mortar tube. It is twenty-two inches long and is made of ¼-inch plywood. Two holes, designated No. 1 and No. 2, are drilled in it.

2. Part B (Figure 3) represents the deflection scale on the M-59

*The recently standardized 4.2-inch mortar M30 is equipped with the M34 sight. The "Killingsworth" device can be easily modified to represent the new sight. (See Figures 5 and 6.)

Title page illustrated by Pvt Jack Radcliff

sight. It is graduated in a manner similar to the sight. It starts at 0 mils at the bottom and goes from right to left to 3200 mils. It then starts at the top at 0 mils and goes from left to right down to 3200 mils. The disk is made of ¼ inch plywood.

3. Part C (Figure 4) is designated to simulate the indicator above the deflection scale on the M-59 sight. On the side is a small nail which represents the tick mark or indicator on the sight.

4. Part D (Figure 5) represents the telescopic sight on the M-59 sight. It is made from an expended .50 caliber shell. The cap end of the round is sawed off, leaving only the round cylinder. Cross hairs are placed on the large end of the cylinder. These cross hairs are made from fine wire fastened to the cylinder with solder or friction tape. When a trainee looks through the cylinder it gives him the same effect as looking through the telescopic sight of the M-59.

5. Part E, the block upon which the eyepiece (D) is mounted is shown in Figure 6.

Assembly

Assembling the various parts of the device is quite easy. They are put together to simulate the actual weapon.



Figure 1. — *Pvt Vincent J. Cafarelli*



Figure 2. Part A. Mortar Tube. — *Hester Caffey*

Part A, representing the mortar tube, has a hole (No. 1) at its base so that it can pivot. B is placed 7½ inches above the base of A. Hole 2 on Part A and the hole in B are lined up and B is then glued or tacked to it (Part A). Part B (the deflection scale) is thus secured to Part A so that it will move with the tube (Part A, figure 7).

At this point it is well to explain that hole 1 is used to house the bolt (see title page) which fastens the entire device to the platform upon which it rests. This permits the device to pivot realistically when adjustments are made. A wing type bolt is used to permit easy removal of the training aid.

The indicator on the M-59 sight moves when the deflection knob is turned. In order to have the indicator (C) turn to make deflection changes, it is placed on top of B,



— *Hester Caffey*

Figure 3. Part B. Deflection Scale.



— *Hester Caffey*

Figure 4. Part C. The Indicator.

aligned with the center hole on B and screwed into place. To eliminate friction a washer should be placed between B and C.



— *Hester Caffey*

Figure 5. Part D. Telescopic Sight (expended .50 caliber shell).

The brass cylinder (D), of course, simulates the telescopic sight on the M-59 sight (Figure 6). D is mounted on E (see Figure 8). The two mounted parts are then nailed or glued to part C.

The finished training aid will look like the one pictured in Figures 1 and 9.

Use of the 4.2-Inch Mortar Training Aid

The training area is set up as in regular mortar training. Platforms similar to pistol rests take the place of the mortars: one training aid to each platform and four to a platoon. Four men are assigned to each device: the gunner, assistant gunner, and two men observing.

Operating procedure is as follows:

1. Having set the aiming circle for the azimuth on which the devices will be laid (same procedure as

as for setting aiming circle for mortars), the aiming circle operator then commands: "Aiming point this instrument."

2. The device operator responds: "Aiming point identified."

3. The aiming circle operator then lays aiming circle reticle on device cross hairs and announces: "Number . . . , deflection. . . ." (The number of the mortar involved and the deflection for that mortar.)

4. The device operator repeats deflection, then rotates the device *motion* to align the azimuth index directly over the announced deflection.

5. Without disturbing the device motion, the device operator rotates entire device while looking through eyepiece until eyepiece cross hairs are aligned on left side of aiming circle ball and socket joint.

6. The device operator then announces: "Mortar number . . . ready for recheck."

7. Steps three through six are repeated until the device and aiming circle readings are the same or differ by only one mil.

8. The gunner then announces "Number . . . zero (or one) mils, mortar laid."

Practical work continues until every student operates both the aiming circle and the training aid.

When the trainees had completed laying the mortars parallel, I would always check to see if the tube of the training aid was really parallel.

Once the class had gone through the problem and performed in a satisfactory manner, they placed out aiming stakes and were given practice in making deflection changes.



— *Roy Medders*

Figure 6. Part E. Eyepiece Mount.

Naturally, no training aid can ever completely replace the 4.2 inch mortar in training. Men must still practice with the actual weapon — when they're available — but as an expedient, or in concurrent training classes, it is really quite satisfactory.

Editor's Note: We wrote the 8th Division for their opinion of this



— Roy Medder

Figure 7. Parts A and B assembled.

training aid. Here's their reply:

"For the past six months the Killingsworth Device has proven its worth to the 8th Division. The trainee using it performs all the movements normally used if he were working with a real mortar and sight, with the exception, of course, of moving the base plate and leveling bubbles. The device, experience has shown, clearly indicates that the men using it learn about the 4.2. For this reason the Killingsworth Device (as we call it) has become more than just a 4.2 inch mortar substitute. It is an essential part of mortar training and a real *training aid.*"



— Roy Medder

Figure 8. Parts D and E assembled.

Let's Fight at Night

Capt Don Humphries and Lt C. C. Livengood

"HEY, JONSEY! Did you hear that? What was it? A twig snapping, you say. You're crazy! That's a man — a commy. Shhhuu! Damn, it's black out tonight. Jonsey, did you hear something? They're coming. Should we fire? Fire what? You say — fire with what I've got in my hand? Oh — yeah — toss a grenade. — Give you one? — Okay! Okay! What'sa matter with using my rifle. — Huh? Oh! Too black out to aim. Tough, ain't it. Sure is dark."

Most of us have been faced with situations similar to the one just described. We recognize that the problem of firing small arms at night is an extremely complex one because of the many variables involved. Yet it must be solved if we are to meet one of the Infantry's most urgent needs. Communist night tactics in Korea, as well as those of the enemy in the Pacific during World War II, are reminders enough that our Infantrymen need more than FPL's and hand grenades to cope with the situation.

The Army is aware of the problem. In the latter part of World War II we began experimenting with infrared equipment. This equipment, at its very best, is only a partial answer. Every man in the front line units should be able to deliver aimed fire, not just the few men armed with the sniperscopes.* Infantry commanders are becoming increasingly aware of the need to fire our small arms at night and at the same time are becoming more convinced that it is feasible.

Our Army is not the only one seeking a solution to the problem. Investigation reveals that the Russians, as well as many of our allies, are searching out possible solutions. The Canadians in particular are now conducting extensive tests in this field of firing small arms at night.

Recent tests conducted by the Weapons Department of The Infantry School, as well as other tests which have been conducted, are encouraging enough for us to believe that there is a possible answer. While these tests are far from conclusive as to the best methods, or the degree of success that can be expected, they do point up the fact that night firing is feasible. However, more important, a few basic principles have resulted

*Since 1945 experiments with infrared equipment have been carried far beyond those conducted during World War II and still continue. Sniperscopes are currently issued on a basis of 6 to each rifle company and 5 to each battalion headquarters company. Other distribution is made throughout the Infantry regiment and in some cases to division special units.

from these tests that lay a firm base from which more objective tests can spring.

As far as we have been able to determine, only one reasonably detailed experiment has been conducted in this field. The mission was to develop a set of sights to be used for both day and night firing. Unfortunately, it was successful only in the respect that it established a more sound premise on which to conduct future tests. Even though it was unsuccessful, we believe the idea should not be discarded.

We can reasonably anticipate your reaction to this business of firing small arms at night — because we've questioned many people. When we were assigned to conduct the tests described below, our first approach to the problem was to ask anyone who might reasonably be expected to have ideas on the subject, "How would you go about firing at night?" At the risk of being facetious, but to report the facts, the usual answer was, "With a gun." It was disconcerting to have our problem regarded so lightly. On the more serious side some people believed you could use the present "daytime" sight, while others thought it possible to sight down the barrel. Some said they used the "instinct of pointing" to hit the target. Characteristic of this line of thought was a statement made by one individual who is particularly well versed in the art of musketry, "I can hit anything I can see, day or night." We put him to the test. Much to his chagrin he was unable to make good his boast. Fortunately his only loss was the coke he'd wagered. However, it might well have been a substantial sum. He was that positive of his ability to fire at night.

On the other side of the fence were the "feet draggers," more currently referred to as the "Doctrine sitters," who thought that the whole idea was a complete waste of time. "Don't be non compos mentis," they said. Even though we can't understand Latin, it hurt our feelings.

And, of course, there were Infantrymen who had done some prior thinking on the subject. They offered us many but varied suggestions — and they were in the majority. They served us well by pointing up the fact that there were absolutely no concrete ideas on the subject and indicated that not enough thought had previously been given the problem.

Other tests have been conducted on this or similar projects, none of which could be called successful, yet all contribute some worthwhile ideas to its eventual solution. The problem was to get factual reports on what has taken place during these tests, since information on all aspects of this night firing problem is virtually nonexistent. On the other hand a lot of these tests included telescopes, collimators* and infrared sights, which are much too complicated and expensive to ever hope for individual issue — and our real problem, how to improve

*The collimator is an optical device used to align the sights of a gun with the vertical plane through the axis of the bore. It can be moved independently of the gun, so that it can be kept sighted on an aiming point. For night use with rifles, two collimators must be used: one for direction, the other for elevation. — The Authors.

the individual's night firing ability, remained.

We did not know what the exact results of these tests were. We had no reports of success or failure. We felt that the best approach to the problem was to exhaust all the solutions developed in these tests and hoped some of the ideas tested would be of value to us.

White String Method

One of the first methods tested was the white string method (Figure 1). This consists of tying a white string between the front and rear sights. Earlier tests indicated that this method had a certain amount of merit. Our tests revealed that this method made it very easy to align the front and rear sights; however, the string appeared as a white blob in front of the eyes.

One thing peculiar to night vision is that the target cannot be seen if there is anything the least distracting between the eye and the target. We found the white blob caused by the string almost eliminated vision in front of the weapon. While we had practically no success with this method we made a few worthwhile discoveries. For example, on a moonlight night experience indicates that one must use a fairly large string and on a very dark night a very small one. However, we've just mentioned the difficulty involved in the use of the string method and while it's somewhat cumbersome it has some merit and warrants more testing.

Figure 1. White String Method.

White Line Method

We also thought a white or luminous line along the top or side of the barrel would allow us to align our sights on a target. As with the white string method, we found white or luminous paint so close to our eye obscured the target. Although we could get the sights aligned horizontally when the line was on the top of the barrel we could not get vertical alignment. When we place the line on the side of the barrel we could get vertical alignment but none horizontally.

Figure 2. Model A Sights.

A series of luminous pegs placed along the top of the barrel and handguard, had the effect of obscuring the vision to the target even though they could be aligned.

Open Sight

We thought an open type sight of either the "V" or partridge type would permit us to align our sights and see the target. Experiments soon showed us that it was necessary to make these sights so large in order to see them at night that it became impossible to take a sight picture clear enough to allow the firer to hit the target. Numerous experiments were conducted along similar lines until we realized there were certain specific problems to be solved before we could work further.

Some Problems and Solutions

First we had to have some method of making the front sight visible. White paint on the front sight did not work. We tried luminous paint on the regular front sight blade but it was too small for night use. We then increased the width of the front sight to about $^{3}/_{16}$ of an inch and the height to one inch. It was then painted with luminous paint. This change enabled us to see it.

Figure 3. Model A Sights — Mounted.

We were not able to see through the aperture in the regular rear sight on most nights, regardless of what color it was painted. This illustrates another feature peculiar to night vision: to see well, it takes a concentrated focus of the eyes. Thus, if it is necessary to look at the sights instead of the target, the target will not be seen. Our solution to this problem was to increase the size of the aperture of the rear sight and allow a proportionately greater amount of light into the eye. We found side or peripheral vision distracting. To eliminate it as much as possible we placed a shield or apron around this aperture.



Figure 4. Model B Front and Rear Sight.

Constructing Sights

After analyzing our problems we proceeded to construct sights of various sizes. These embraced the following desired characteristics: (1) oversized front sights painted luminous, (2) enlarged rear sight apertures with shielding aprons painted black to be mounted to the rear of the receiver, (3) an enlarged aperture with shielding aprons painted white to be mounted forward of the receiver.

Model A

The rear sights of Model A (see Figures 2 and 3) are mounted forward of the receiver with an aperture of approximately 1½ inches in diameter, painted white to give a

Figure 5. Model B Rear Sight — Being Mounted.

Figure 6. Model B — Front Sight Being Mounted.

clearly defined hole, with a shield of approximately 2½" x 2½". The front sight blade measures 3/16" x 1" and is coated with luminous paint. We found that on a very dark night (moonless and overcast) we could get good sight alignment and score 7 out of 8 hits at 50 yards. On a moonlight night (full moon and no clouds) we could not get good enough alignment to hit the target consistently. Five out of 10 hits were scored at the same range. We did not consider this good enough so we concentrated our efforts on the Model B.

Model B

On Model B (see Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7) the sights are mounted in rear of the receiver with an aperture of about ½ inch in diameter. The aperture is painted black to eliminate any color distraction. By the use of a shielding apron (2" x 2") it was found to be most successful. With this set of sights we were able to get 5 hits out of 8 at 50 yards on the same very dark night described above. On a moonlight night, however, we were able to get 15 hits out of 15 at 50 yards; 9 out of 10 hits at 75 yards; and 7 out of 10 hits at 100 yards. At 225 yards we scored only 2 out of 15. This drop off at 225 yards was due to the fact that the weapon was zeroed to hit at the point of aim at short ranges. Since the drop of the

Figure 7. Model B — Front and Rear Sights Mounted.

bullet is considerable at 225 yards and we had no way of raising the rear sight to compensate for this, we felt that the results were exceptional.

Test Results

Even though these tests are not conclusive, and for that matter are not in any sense completed, we are offering what we believe to be sound conclusions up to this point. Now, there is no indication that a single sighting system will suffice for both day and night firing. We have discussed two sets of sights, Models A and B, which were designed especially for night firing. If we have to choose one, we believe the Model B type is far superior. Increasing the size of the aperture gives much better results on darker nights. The optimum would be a rear sight with a round or diamond shaped variable aperture with a side vision shield plus a front sight that could be seen and used during both day and night. The variable aperture could be modeled after a simplified version of a camera shutter.

It's a real problem. Korea has increased the emphasis for training men in night fighting, but the rank and file of us have given little attention to the business of firing small arms — particularly the rifle — at night. If you have any solutions you think workable we'd certainly like to hear about them.

Realism!



MAJOR FRANK J. SPETTEL

✔ How can we train our men to have confidence . . . to react quickly and aggressively at close quarters?

EPISODE 1: Leyte; 1944. Tank crew refueling amphibian tractor. Vehicle commander standing guard while other members of crew empty five-gallon cans into gas tank. Jap, armed with rifle, steps out of bushes, appears startled, starts to bring rifle up. Tank commander, also startled, drops carbine, picks up rock, hurls it at Jap, knocks him unconscious.

Question: Why didn't the tank commander use his carbine? Even after he dropped it, why didn't he pick it up instead of choosing a rock for a weapon?

Episode 2: Korea; 1950. Rifle company in approach march on road. Lead man in point approaches road junction, meets point man of North Korean patrol also approaching the road junction. Yells and signals for North Korean to put burp gun down and give himself up. North Korean refuses. The two soldiers start to circle each other like boxers, then GI starts to close in with his hands. GI receives burst in the belly and is dead before he hits the ground.

Question: After the lead man in the point referred to in episode 2 had no success at taking a prisoner, why didn't he "shoot first and ask questions later?" Before attempting to disarm the North Korean why didn't he designate a teammate to cover him?

Episode 3: Korea; 1951. Rifle company in the attack, leading squads just reaching the top of the objective, a natural revetment of large, craggy rocks. A squad leader twists around a boulder, finds himself face-to-face with a Chinese soldier at a distance of fifteen yards. Squad leader starts to hit the ground, receives several rounds from a burp gun in his shoulders. Chinese takes off.

Question: In episode 3 why was the squad leader's first reaction to hit the ground when confronted by the Chinese behind the boulder? Why didn't he use his M1 quickly, from the hip?

The big questions that remain, however, are how can we train all our men to have confidence in their weapons, to react quickly and to act

Editor's Note: This article, which discusses the Close Combat Course, is the third of five articles on the latest Battle Indoctrination Series, based on Department of the Army Training Circular Number 14, 28 March 1952.

The Close Combat Course described in this article can, with minor adaptations, be used in unit training.

aggressively when at close quarters with the enemy? And equally important, how can we avoid a repetition of the three episodes just described?

The Close Combat Course, a part of the Battle Indoctrination Series, outlined in principle in D/A Training Circular 14, 28 March 52, is the Field Forces' answer to this training problem. When laid out on a realistic range, conducted in a reasonably safe, realistic manner with a minimum of artificial restrictions, this course can go a long way toward attaining the training objectives we are after; namely, the quick aggressive use of the rifle against surprise targets at close ranges in all situations; teaching mutual combat support and teamwork between individuals; building our soldiers' confidence in themselves, their rifles, their teammates, and in the ability of the small rifle team to cope with most of the situations they will come up against in close combat.

Generally speaking, most close combat courses at present fall into two classes, neither of which attains the proper realism or produces the desired reaction from our men. On the one type course the firers go through lanes which are very definitely channelized, usually marked with engineer tape or barbed wire. Targets appear in the same relative position from the firer at all times. On the other type, lanes are not tightly channelized. Because of this, however, there are many safety and control restrictions and so much supervisory personnel, that all realism (and interest) is lost. Perhaps some of the courses now in use can be modified and improved. Those of you who are or will be confronted with the problem of planning, constructing, or operating new courses may get some ideas from the following material.

Department of the Army Training Circular 14 states that six men (as a team) will negotiate the Close Combat Course at a time. They represent the five riflemen of a rifle squad under the control of their squad leader. Notice that the assistant squad leader or the AR team is not included. Should these men run the course they would do so as riflemen. It must be remembered that it is not the purpose of the Close Combat Course to teach tactics; we are concerned primarily with developing the individual soldier's self-confidence and his confidence in the men near him. Another purpose of the course is to teach the soldier how to use his M1 rifle aggressively. These men, carrying a couple of practice grenades each, will advance through the course in a skirmish line with fixed bayonets. They will cross simple obstacles (low, tactical wire and sandbag walls) which require teamwork in the actual crossing or in the use of covering fire. They will reduce surprise targets by aggressive, individual fire or by fire and maneuver as directed by the squad leader. Grenades, bayonets, assault fire should all be used when applicable.

With the possible exception of the Control Officer (more about him later) and the Safety Officer, required by Department of the Army regulations, there should be no

control personnel on the course. The Safety Officer should be instructed to interfere only if an individual's life is in jeopardy. If possible, he should follow the team by bounds, staying only close enough to intercede when necessary.

Now that we know what is to be accomplished, let's see how to plan and construct a course that will be realistic yet conform to safety regulations and use a minimum of outside control and safety personnel.

Terrain, Impact Area, Firing Limits

We shall have to think of three things when selecting terrain: the type desired, the amount required for the course, and the amount necessary for an impact area. As with all field firing exercises, we will need natural, varying terrain. Terrain that conforms to that of the theater we anticipate operating in is most desirable. Generally speaking, however, if we can meet the following requirements, the terrain will be satisfactory: (1) concealment for surprise targets, (2) simple, natural obstacles, and (3) observation and fields of fire.

If nature provides no obstacles, then it is necessary to plant shrubbery, blow craters, or put up tactical wire and log walls. Don't forget this is *not* an obstacle course. Emphasis should *not* be placed on the creation of difficult obstacles.

No definite rule exists concerning the size of the course. There are, however, two restraining features that we might keep in mind in deciding upon the size. These



Figure 1. Impact area requirements for hypothetical close combat course.

are: (1) the impact area increases disproportionately as the size of the course becomes greater, and (2) the proposed allowance of ammunition is not definitely known, but it seems reasonable to assume that a limit of twenty-five to thirty rounds per individual will be imposed. (If the soldier is to use his rifle aggressively, the number of targets will of necessity be limited.) The course should be large enough to permit variety in the location and dispersion of targets, and to allow the team some freedom of movement. We have found that a course eighty yards wide by two hundred yards long (plainly marked by painted posts) is sufficient. The maximum size of the course will be limited by the amount of terrain allotted for an impact area.

Figure 1 shows the impact area requirements for a hypothetical close combat course. The angles and figures will vary for different courses according to the total terrain available, but the principles illustrated will be identical. The rectangle at the bottom of Figure 1 represents a close combat course which we will assume to be eighty yards wide by two hundred yards long. The arrows marked "Firing Limit" indicate the extreme limits of our deliberate fire to the right and left of the course. On this particular course we may fire thirty degrees to the right and to the left of the long axis of the course. Department of the Army Regulations specify that on ranges where the rifle is fired, we must have an impact area of four thousand yards in any direction we desire to use. This distance is measured from the farthest point down range from which we intend to fire. These regulations also stipulate that the Post Commander shall inspect each range and determine whether or not any additional safety factor is required to take care of ricochets and unaimed shots. In this case we will assume that a safety area, requiring an additional thirty degrees to the right and left of the firing limits, extending out for twelve hundred yards and then paralleling the firing limits to the 4,000-yard arc, is required. It can now be more readily seen why the total area allowed for an impact area influences the size of the actual course. If we fire more than thirty degrees to the right or left we shall fire upon South Road or into the schoolhouse. If we fire from any point farther down range than two hundred yards we fire onto East Road.

At almost every Army post we are going to have similar restrictions imposed in the form of firing limits. At very few posts is terrain so unlimited that one is allowed a 180° firing limit. One of the biggest problems we have in planning our course is placing targets so that no man will fire outside our right and left firing limits. To add to our difficulties we must have no control personnel on the course telling a man that he may or may not fire at a target when it appears. A study of Figure 2 presents a solution to this problem.

In Figure 2 our Close Combat Course is drawn to scale and marked off in increments of ten yards on the right. The arrows at the bottom (right and left) indicate the thirty degree firing limits.



Figure 2. Close-up of close-combat course.

"A," "B," "C," etc., are points on the ground where we think it logical to place targets, and which we have accurately plotted on the scale drawing. The six-man firing team is on the starting line. "A" is one of the points selected as a position for a bobbing target. After drawing lines through "A," parallel to the right and left firing limits, we see that it would be safe for all six men of the firing team to fire at this target simultaneously. This target could have been placed anywhere within the angle "a" formed by the crossfire of Nos. 1 and 6. The greater the range at which the target is placed, the more lateral movement is allowed until, at one hundred and forty yards, the target could be placed right on the edge of the course (Target "B"), if a still greater range is desired in the impact area (Target "C"). We will want some targets placed at these extreme ranges; however, we desire that most of the targets be exposed at lesser ranges.

Let's move the firing team down through the course until it is on Phase Line *LOGS*, and expose Target "D." By drawing lines through "D," parallel to the firing limits, we find that only firers 4, 5 and 6 may safely fire at this target without violating the right firing limit. The problem now is to ensure that Nos. 1, 2 and 3 do not fire at it. As the lesser of several evils we impose a slightly unrealistic condition upon the firing team at this point. We must thoroughly orient the firers that *no man may fire at a target unless it is visible to him.* Then, in the case of Target "D," we simply hide the target from Nos. 1, 2 and 3. It can be hidden in any number of ways. For example: as in Figure 2, by transplanting a bush between the target and the unsafe firers: by constructing the target so that it swings from the side of a tree or stump and is visible only to Nos. 4, 5 and 6. In the case of Target "E," it is plain that only Nos. 1 and 2 may safely fire at it from Phase Line *LOGS*. In order to expose it at this time, we must hide it from Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Using this system, targets may be brought in as close as five yards from the team, providing that only one man can see it and that he doesn't fire more than thirty degrees to his right or left to hit it. This system leaves safety in the hands of two people — the control officer who permits firing only on safe and appropriate targets and the individual firer who must not fire at any target that is not clearly visible to him.

Targets, Pits, Communications

Targets should all be of the surprise type — bobbing up from the ground, swinging out from one side of a tree or stump, or some type of moving target. They should all be either camouflaged or painted to represent enemy soldiers. Figure 3 shows two types of targets that are easily constructed.

Targets may be operated from one central pit (however, this requires an excessive amount of cable) or from several pits out on the course, each pit operating two or three targets. If the latter system is used, the pits should be sodded or otherwise camouflaged so that the team cannot easily determine the location of targets.

The Control Officer should be so situated that he may view the entire course and see the firing



Figure 3. (Top) Pop-up target.
(Bottom) Swinging target.

team at all times. There are several means of communication available for use between the Control Officer and the pits, such as EE-8 telephone, sound-powered phone and portable radio. The first of these (EE-8 telephone) is the most satisfactory. Should the Close Combat Course be long or so heavily wooded as to limit the Control Officer's ability to see the team at all times, it may be more suitable to have him follow the team and call the pit operators with a portable radio. If the course is to be used often, phone lines and target cables should be buried to prevent their being hit by the team's fire.

Control of Targets

In order for the Control Officer to present targets that are safe to fire upon, a system must be devised that enables him to tell at a glance just how far the team is from any target at any given time. It is far better if a definite pattern of target exposure is worked out and remains at the Control Officer's fingertips. The following setup works very satisfactorily. (See Figure 4).

In the construction of the course we have created several simple obstacles that the firing team must cross. These may be low, tactical wire, sandbag walls, ditches or felled logs. To the team they are obstacles, but to the Control Officer they are phase lines. On the course depicted in Figure 4 we have set up a double apron wire fence, a single-strand fence, and a row of logs. After finding likely locations for targets on the ground, we consider our firing limits and, as in Figure 2, determine which men can safely fire at each target from the vicinity of these phase lines. We then give the Control Officer two diagrams to aid him in presenting targets. (See Figure 4).

These two diagrams will be used together. They are both drawn to scale and the phase lines (obstacles) are plotted accurately. On the left chart in Figure 4 are plotted the locations of each pit and target. The boxes represent the pits; the "x's," targets; and lines, the general trace of the cable that operates the target. For ease of identification the pits are lettered and the targets at each pit numbered. The distances in yards (or paces) between phase lines are indicated. Thus, by watching the position of the team on the ground in respect to one of the obstacles, the Control Officer can tell by glancing at this chart how far the team is from any given target. In this way he will be able to determine whether or not the team is in a safe position (and at a safe distance) to fire upon the target.

The chart on the right is the actual control plan. When it is established which men may fire upon a specific target from a given phase line, the pattern is marked on the chart. The combination of letters and numbers shows the Control Officer where the team should be on the ground in respect to a phase line when a given target may safely be exposed. As an example: a glance at the chart shows that when the team has moved from the Starting Line and is approaching the double apron fence, Target "A" is to be pulled. Should a quick safety check be required, a look at the "Targets and Pits" Chart will show Target "A" to be seventy yards from the tactical wire and a



Figure 4. Control Chart used by the Control Officer.

safe target for all six men to fire upon simultaneously.

Back to the Control Plan, as the team reaches the single-strand fence, Targets "B1" and "B2" are pulled at the same time — "B1" for Nos. 4, 5 and 6; "B2" for Nos. 1 and 2. Both of these targets have been hidden from No. 3 who cannot safely fire at either. Five yards before the team reaches the row of felled logs, Target "C2," hidden from all firers except No. 2, is exposed for him to fire upon. Immediately after the team crosses the logs, Target "C1" is put up for Nos. 5 and 6.

Careful planning and construction of a Close Combat Course such as the one outlined here meets all safety requirements, with the exception of local ground rules. Properly managed, it will give your soldiers a maximum amount of self-confidence as well as training in aggressive, individual action against the enemy at close quarters.

WE NEED INTELLIGENCE AND *Raider* PLATOONS

LT WILLIAM C. KIMBALL

✔ Here is a proposal—based on Korean experience. You be the judge . . .

DURING MUCH OF THE FIGHTING in Korea commanders have been considerably disturbed by the enemy's ability to fight well at night. Initially our forces were at a disadvantage — since night fighting was not sufficiently stressed in their training. This handicap has since been corrected and our forces have now mastered night fighting techniques. In spite of this, however, I do not feel that commanders have adequate means to counteract the measures taken by the enemy to avoid our fire power at night.

To beat the enemy at his own game, we need a group of specialists* — specialists in stealth, killing and above all, **seeing** at night. Because of our daylight operations the enemy is forced to fight, resupply, reinforce, and retrench at night. Our reconnaissance reports sent in from daylight patrols provide only a small portion of the intelligence data required. Reports of enemy movements must come at a time when he **is** moving and not **after** he has moved. These reports must come from night patrols — and night patrolling calls for specialists.

It seems to me that we need an Intelligence and *Raider* Platoon rather than the existing Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. In the portion of this article which follows I will more specially indicate the type training required by this proposed platoon as well as their organization and equipment. A force so trained, organized and equipped could provide commanders with the information they need, when they need it.

Training

The men selected for this job (let's call them the Intelligence and Raider Platoon) must be trained in all phases of intelligence reporting. They must be taught that they are "leg men" for the regimental S2; that the details they report are fitted into a picture for the regimental commander, and without those details the commander will experience difficulty in arriving at his decision. They must be taught that *EVERYTHING* they see, hear, or smell is important and *must be reported.* This will be the theme of the whole training cycle: see it, hear it, smell it, feel it — REPORT IT!

The men must be trained to observe at night. In addition to night vision training they must be taught

*See "Standardize or Specialize" in the July 1952 QUARTERLY for the pros and cons of specialization.

to observe such things as foot prints, well-used paths, sounds of digging, voices, and truck tracks (how many and how long ago?). All of these go to make the big picture, the one the commander must have.

Although the tactical training of the unit should follow the principles established by our manuals, these additional points should be emphasized:

Silence

Teach the men that they place themselves and their comrades in danger each time they cough, sneeze, or whisper. Don't worry too much about how to stop such things: each individual will do that in his own way. Stopping a cough one way will work for one man but will only increase the coughing of another. However, you can teach a man to whisper by telling him to let almost all the air out of his lungs before speaking and then to enunciate clearly.

Formations

The men must be taught to react as a unit in all situations. If a perimeter is needed, a soft signal should move the men in the minimum length of time without confusion. If an attack is needed a squad should be dispatched immediately. Figure 1 shows prearranged plans that might be employed.

Signals

Of all the many sets of signals and signalling techniques that can be used — pyrotechnics — the one employed by the enemy is the best. Because of a shortage of Very Pistols in the Far East, my unit found that some improvising had to be done. We used rifle-launched parachute flares, minus the parachutes. This cuts down illumination and burning time but does not harm the flare itself. These signals can be used to coordinate assault and covering fires, artillery fires*, recognition, and withdrawal. These signals should be kept at a minimum, of course, to avoid confusing the unit.

If some of the technical disadvantages could be eliminated from infrared set and metascopes this means of signalling might be employed. It would certainly be a safer and more effective method. This would be particularly advantageous in Korea where the enemy (to date) has not been known to use infrared devices.

Fire Control

All firing at night should be on command for this reason: if a single round is fired prematurely from an ambush position, all the targets vanish before any other weapons can get off a single round. At night, more than at any other time, fire superiority must be gained with the *initial* burst.

Special Training

Weapons training should be carried on as usual, but with special emphasis on immediate action and assembly and disassembly of automatic weapons *in darkness*. Above all, the men should be taught that the average soldier almost invariably fires *high* in the dark. The large number of neck and head

*To direct artillery fire the SRC 610 was used. Lt. Kimbel reports that while it was bulky it was exceedingly dependable.



Fig. 1

— *Cpl Jack Heron*

wounds suffered at night by both sides would tend to verify** this observation. The men should be taught how to hit targets that loom suddenly and without warning, out of the dark. Since these men will be called on to reconnoiter and to fight on terrain (at night) that they have never seen before, instruction in map reading takes on added importance. It will sometimes be impossible to give the unit a look at the terrain in daylight that they will fight over in darkness.

Subjects allied to map reading, such as orientation at night by the use of stars, terrain recognition (terrain seen in daylight often looks entirely different at night), following a selected compass course,

**The Weapons Department of The Infantry School is unable to verify Lt Kimball's observation. It would appear to be most difficult to determine how many of these casualties were hit while in upright or standing positions. Tests are currently being conducted to determine aids and techniques for night firing — perhaps at the completion of these tests this statement can be verified.

recognition of land marks, and how to estimate distance traveled should be covered thoroughly. Weakness in this last subject has caused more mission failures than all other factors together. A man walking toward the enemy at night will swear that he has traveled 3,000 yards when he has actually only traveled 300. To prevent this, training in the recognition of land marks and distance evaluation must be given.

Small infiltrating patrols hiding out during the day can wreak havoc in the enemy's backyard by adjusting artillery and mortar fire on apparently concealed and camouflaged positions, otherwise outside the limits of our visibility. This subject deserves a lot of time in the training schedule. This same technique can be used in the adjustment of air strikes on targets concealed from the air, but easily seen by a ground observer.

All men in the unit should be instructed extensively in the use of demolitions, mines, and booby-traps. There is nothing more demoralizing to an enemy than to find that his backyard, once believed safe, is now a death trap.

Sniping has yielded a satisfying casualty figure in Korea. A sniper team of four men, under a sniper chief, can serve a triple purpose: they can lower the morale of the enemy, destroy his personnel and secure valuable information about his movements. Sniping should be emphasized now more than ever.

Since these men will be expected to penetrate deep into enemy territory, evacuation of wounded will be difficult, to say the least. A sound knowledge of first aid and use of the "buddy system" is mandatory.

Characteristics and functioning of all available types of enemy weapons must be taught the unit. They should at least know how to fire them. It is not impossible that a patrol ranging deep will have to destroy their own weapons for lack of ammunition and use enemy weapons.

They should be taught everything there is to know about the enemy soldier and how they can expect him to react. In the case of the Chinese, the men should be taught that the Chinese soldier is strictly an individualist and will fight to death only when he is surrounded by his comrades. Once isolated, he will more than likely give up. Enemy tactics should be studied with vigor. Questions like, "How large are his patrols?" "Does he like to ambush?" "Where can he be found to be weak in defense?" "Will he fight with a knife or bayonet?" "What are his religious taboos and can we use them psychologically?" must be discussed, answered and understood. In other words, the soldier should know almost as much about the enemy as the enemy does about himself. The soldier should be taught special phrases in the enemy's language for use in certain situations. For instance: there have been many times recently when prisoners could have been induced to come out of bunkers had one of our men known how to say, "Come out and you won't be harmed. Stay there and we will have to kill you," in Chinese. Other useful phrases: "Hands up." "Follow me." "Where are your automatic weapons?" (Have the prisoner point.) "Where are your troops?" A few of these are enough and fairly easy to learn.

Physical training must be active, strenuous, and never-ending. In combat the men will be called on to travel fast over difficult terrain for hours, or lie perfectly still for hours on end, either of which call for perfect physical conditioning. They cannot afford to be burdened down with rations for a two- or three-day trip into enemy territory, so they will have to subsist sometimes on one can of C-rations per day. Each man's ability to stay alive will at one time or another depend on his ability to "take it."

Organization and Equipment

The Intelligence and Raider Platoon should be organized on a rifle platoon basis with four nine-man squads. The only actual difference between the organization of the existing Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon and the proposed Intelligence and Raider Platoon is within the squads. The squad is composed of the squad leader, armed with a carbine M-2*, 300 rounds of ammunition, 4 fragmentation grenades and one WP grenade; No. 2 man — sniperscope**, 300 rounds, 4 fragmentation grenades; No. 3 man — carbine M-2, 300 rounds, 4 fragmentation grenades and demolitions pack.*** Nos. 4, 5, and 6 are similarly equipped.

Nos. 7 and 8 are the light machine gun team; 7 carries a carbine M-2, 300 rounds, 4 fragmentation grenades and his back pack contains 500 rounds of link belt ammunition for the machine gun. The ammunition is layered in the pack and feeds directly from the assistant gunner's back, out the right hand top of the pack, and into the left of the receiver. The gunner carries an A-6 LMG and a similar pack. However, in his pack the ammunition is layered to feed from the gunner's back from the left and directly into the receiver. (See Figure 2.) The most important reason for feeding from packs is that it enables the gunner to move without going into and out of action. It also does away with rattling boxes of ammunition and leaves the assistant gunner with both hands free to fire while the gunner is reloading or applying immediate action.

No. 9 man — assistant squad leader, armed with M-1 rifle, with grenade launcher, 128 rounds of ammunition and 16 rounds of grenade launcher cartridges. He is equipped with a 60-mm ammunition bag and carries 8 rounds of 60-mm ammu-

*Don't make the mistake of underestimating the Carbine M-2. The men who operated under this setup, the Grenadier Platoon of the 21st Infantry, swear by it. It was the only weapon that fired consistently under conditions ranging to 20 degrees below Zero. It was picked as a basic weapon because of its light weight, close in punch and terrific fire power.

**Because of its weight (32 pounds) the sniperscope is not considered a suitable weapon for use by patrols. As recommended here, the No. 2 man would carry the sniperscope (32 pounds), ammunition (11½ pounds) and grenades (5 pounds), a total of 48½ pounds which is considered too much for patrol action.

***The pack contains 8 1-pound blocks of composition C-3; 4 feet of prima (or detonating) cord; prepared fuses, both electric and percussion, one antipersonnel mine, with fuses.

nition wired to grenade adapters.* This is the "Mortar Section" for the platoon. There are four of these in the unit and since targets are engaged at less than one hundred yards at night, the 60 shell adds greatly to the punch of the organization.

men you pick for the mission and you are ready to go. When they are equipped with their normal armament, you have a unit that carries a terrific fire power punch: a basic load of ammunition that number 12,000 rounds and a full cyclic rate of 6,000 rounds per minute.

Figure 2.

One advantage of this organization is its flexibility. If a sniper observer team is needed, you have only to issue sniper rifles to the

Tactics

In a defensive or static situation, this type platoon is used to maintain contact, gather intelligence

*Tests by Army Field Forces Board No. 3 at Fort Benning in 1951 with the use of the 60-mm mortar shell, "Fuller Bomb," fired from a rifle grenade launcher disclosed: that after 2-3 rounds the rifle stock was damaged and after 10-12 rounds the M1 rifle stock was completely smashed. The range of the shell varied from 95-130 yards. Due to the damage to the rifle and short range the "Fuller Bomb" was not considered.

The use of the fragmentation hand grenade fired with the grenade projection adapter M1A1 has practically the same bursting radius as the 60-mm mortar shell, can be fired a greater range, air burst can be used and weighs only 22.4 ounces as against the 2.94 pound 60-mm mortar round.

D39330

data, and keep the enemy off balance by well-timed and planned raids on his rear areas. Weather allowing, the unit can infiltrate the enemy MLR, raid at night, hide during the day, observe for artillery, and direct air strikes, and do all these things for periods up to 4 days and nights. Since the occupational hazards are many, the unit should be made up entirely of volunteers.

Selecting Leaders

As in all organizations leaders must be chosen for their ability to instill confidence in their men. In night fighting, the *squad* is the basic fighting unit (even more so than in the daytime); you *must* have squad leaders that you can depend on. They must be the first to attack when "Follow Me" are the only words that will move a man forward. They must have a flair for leadership and should be half hunter and half killer, and above all *They Must Know Their Job.*



The Real Thing

By now you are probably asking if a unit of this type has ever really been combat tested. It has been — in the form of the "Grenadiers," 21st Infantry Regiment.

Here are a few of the missions that unit performed:

1. The very first was a combat patrol of two nights and one day spent looking for a fight in and around Kumsong, Korea. On the second night we found it: a 15-man Chinese patrol was contacted by two 5-man patrols from the rear and flanks until they came upon our base and then they were hit from 3 sides with AW fire. We claimed 12 casualties, including daylight sniping and lost only one friendly.

2. On another occasion a "Grenadier" reconnaissance patrol foiled an ambush by 25 Chinese one night by coming in behind them.

3. A Grenadier patrol once found themselves between 2 ambushes when another group of enemy opened up from their rear. The men, in snow suits, lay in the snow and let both groups come down and then opened up. Result, 12 counted Chinese dead, 13 estimated casualties, one prisoner (who later died). Papers proved him to be a platoon leader with a roster of 50 Chinese in his pocket.

4. One of our reconnaissance patrols (they were never less than 5 men or more than 9) ranged as deep as 2 miles into Chinese territory with results that were amazing from an intelligence viewpoint. They plotted firing positions of mortars and field guns (these were later verified by Flash and Sound teams), and brought back information impossible to attain in the daytime.

5. Snipers accounted for 12 enemy casualties on two missions and lost only one man.

These men became so used to fighting at night that they were continually saying: "Only damn fools patrol in the daytime."

Colonel Herbert J. Vander Heide, former commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment, has this to say: "The 'Gimlet Grenadiers' were successful beyond expectation. They usually worked in groups of four or five men and were especially adept at gaining information and raising havoc in rear areas. Using the advantages afforded by night, they outwitted and humiliated the Chinese Communist in every encounter. Much of their success must be contributed to the individual skill and daring of its members — all of whom were volunteers."

What's Your Opinion?

Some of those I've discussed the "Intelligence and Raider" unit with feel that what we really need to do is train the present Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon along the lines proposed. This they say will eliminate specialization — and avoid further changes in present TO&E's. Others claim the only thing wrong with the present I & R Platoon is that it's not often employed correctly. . . . I certainly won't argue. These are all thoughts to be considered.

An organization, such as I have just outlined *will* require especially well trained men and carefully selected leaders. To be of greatest value to a commander they must all be high caliber Infantrymen. Now while you are evaluating my proposed Intelligence and Raider Platoon — put yourself in the position of a regimental commander. Ask yourself: will it benefit me? I believe such specialists will aid immeasurably.

Now what is your opinion?

Editor's Note: The author, who is now a company commander in the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, formerly commanded the "Grenadiers" (21st Infantry Regiment), an Intelligence and *Raider* type unit. His experiences with the latter form the basis for this story. Publication of this article should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting the thought of The Infantry School or the Infantry School *Quarterly*.

Keep It Simple

COL N. J. WILEY, JR.

"SIR! WHAT DO YOU really mean by Countour System?" asked the trainee.

The lieutenant, who put aside his pointer, frowned and scratched the back of his neck. "Why," he replied, "I've just finished explaining it. Didn't you hear me?"

"Yes, sir, but I still don't see it. Everything still looks flat on the maps — anyway I still don't understand."

This is not an unfamiliar incident. It has, I'm certain, happened many times, but I remembered this particular case quite well, although it occurred a long time ago, because I was the lieutenant.

In those days (the campaign hat days) as today, no instructor wanted to feel he wasn't putting across his subject. It made no difference if only one man out of 50 failed to grasp the material. That one man might conceivably make the difference between some unit's success or failure.

True, in those days we didn't have many of the attractive visual aids available to instructors today, so we frequently had to improvise. I've noticed that in spite of our modern training aids, the conscientious instructor still improvises to put across a subject particularly difficult for the student to grasp. And I also suspect that many of you are miles from a source of the newer aids. You probably have to "dream up" ideas that will help a student learn the subject you're teaching.

That's why I'm looking back over the years at the embarrassed lieutenant and the student who said, "I don't get it." Like you, I immediately started "dreaming up" some ideas. One of these has stood up well in teaching contours. That's why I'm passing it on.

The Contour System

Keep in mind that the green student has difficulty grasping the meaning of the contour system. Start off by telling them what contours are. During your explanation produce a school child's metal, collapsible cup. (You can purchase one in almost any dime store.) (Figure 1.) Place the inverted cup on a table and show them that each ring represents a single contour, the same height from the table all around the cup and, of course, at the same elevation. Mark each ring with color so they'll stand out. When you've finished explaining one ring proceed to the others.

This procedure enables a green student to visualize contours. Now you come to the difficult part — helping the student see contours on a flat map. Here's what you can do. Place the cup on a piece of paper and draw a line around



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

— Cpl Jack Heron

3.

the part resting on the paper. Then collapse the cup (figure 2) and at once the student will see that each of the previously elevated and marked contours will be represented by concentric rings. Next remove the cup and draw similar rings on the paper. You'll find that in most cases the student SEES the contours and will be able to visualize elevations on a map. He usually retains the picture of the cup and this assists him materially. Naturally, he will still need practice.

Here's another idea. Try using an old campaign hat (Figure 3) (if you can find one) or an old felt hat. By using the hats you can vary the pattern of contour lines.

Once you've put across the essentials move on to other subjects.

Keep It Simple

Above all — I've found that if the instructor remembers map reading is foreign to the new students, and acts accordingly by relating map reading to the familiar and by keeping his visual aids simple, the student will not only learn, but will retain what he's learned.

I believe that every right implies a responsibility; every opportunity, an obligation; every possession, a duty.

— John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

Combat and Training Tips

The following combat information and tricks of the trade have been extracted from Combat Training Bulletins published by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces. They are reprinted here as background information that will be useful to the combat Infantrymen everywhere.

Need for More Tank-Infantry Training

Here are some comments made by a tank commander in Korea. Many men still don't know there is a way to talk to the tank commander through the external interphone. They will not stay clear of the tank on the offensive and by bunching around the tank restrict its movement. More important, whenever a tank hits a mine, the flying suspension and tract can be as dangerous to an Infantryman as enemy fire.

Patrolling — Tanks and Infantry

1. When possible, patrol leaders should be given their mission in ample time to allow for the briefing of the tank commander. Too often patrols are ordered out with insufficient information as to location of adjacent friendly units, and seldom is time allowed to actually contact these units prior to passing through or near their positions.

2. When patrolling in areas where the enemy is employing antitank mines and the terrain restricts the movement of tanks to narrow roads, trails or river beds, the Infantry must be trained to walk at a safe distance from the tank.

3. On small patrols when heavy weapons are not carried by the Infantry, target designation is greatly improved if each BAR man will carry a magazine of tracer ammunition to be used for marking targets for the tanks.

Rescuing Wounded With Tanks

The escape hatch of a tank may be used to get wounded into the tank while under intense enemy small arms fire. An instance has

been reported of an Infantryman being wounded and subsequently killed because he was unaware that he could be saved by such a method. He was lying wounded in the road and efforts of the medics to get him were ineffective. A tank commander moved his tank forward to straddle the man and get him into the tank through the escape hatch. The wounded man failed to realize the intent of the tank commander, feared that he was to be run over and kept crawling ahead of the tank. The enemy finally noticed the movement of the wounded man and killed him. A set of signals or prearranged plans between Infantry and tank platoon leaders and passed down to all troops may save lives in the future.

Enemy Offensive Tactics

Probing attacks and a shifting of units are two significant signs that the enemy is about to launch an offensive. These probing attacks, which begin as much as two weeks prior to the attack, are for the purpose of locating weak points in our line; determining unit disposition; locating crew served and automatic weapons, and, if possible, our artillery positions.

The shifting of units is based upon the enemy tactical doctrine that designates a unit for either offensive or defensive employment. It is therefore necessary to move the offensive units forward prior to the initiation of the offensive. This action, which is often readily discernible, usually takes place 5 to 36 hours prior to the attack.

The enemy usually elects to attack under cover of darkness because it is at this time that UN Air, Artillery and Tank support are less effective. The enemy attack is designed to secure the objective prior to daylight. If delayed, UN firepower can be directed on his exposed forces. Junior CCF officers, therefore, are trained to estimate the situation at daylight and to determine if the attacked forces are disorganized and the attack should be continued, or if it would be more expedient to withdraw and await the cover and protection of another night. Once an attack is launched, the enemy, because of poor communications, has great difficulty in either controlling his units or of halting an attack. He is, therefore, often forced to continue the attack even under very adverse conditions. The attack pattern of the enemy is to follow an artillery or mortar barrage by Infantry assaults. Flank support is obtained by machine gun fire. Constant pressure against the attacked force is maintained by sending wave after wave of Infantry troops into battle. If his attack should effect a penetration he can be expected to exploit it to the maximum. The usual procedure is to attempt an envelopment, and at the same time send small units to cut the MSR or destroy artillery positions.

Fortunately, the enemy lacks the logistical capacity to effect a continuing supply for his combat troops from his rear areas. He therefore creates many small supply dumps from 5 to 25 miles from the front. When an attack is launched, the assault troops carry from 5 to 7 days' rations with resupply to be accomplished from these small scattered supply points. To date this system has not functioned effectively, with the result

that enemy operations are ineffective after 5 to 7 days. It can be expected that the enemy will try to overcome this problem prior to a new offensive.

Commanders' Comments From Korea

A program was initiated to coordinate artillery fires with illumination furnished by searchlights. These lights were utilized on call through normal artillery channels. Forward observers controlled the movement of the beam of light in much the same manner as the adjustment of fire. An example of the value of this coordination was demonstrated on the night of — April. Searchlights picked up a large number of the enemy, enabling the observer to quickly adjust and mass effective fire on them. Heavy casualties were inflicted.

57-mm Recoilless Rifle

Rifle companies are completely sold on the 57-mm recoilless rifle. It is utilized in close support of leading elements. It has been of great value in penetrating bunker type defenses. The flash does not disclose locations.

Bayonets

The following statements were made by commanders on the effective use of bayonet charges:

All American soldiers jumped from their positions and ran up the hill screaming and yelling. The enemy stopped firing, ran off the back side of the hill, leaving their heavy and light machine guns.

The company commander ordered a bayonet charge upon the enemy entrenched on a hill. The enemy made no attempt to run, but engaged in close fighting and hand to hand combat. After the hill was secured 47 enemy dead were counted on the forward slope. 30 of whom had met death from the bayonet. On the reverse slope another 50 enemy dead were counted who had died of bayonet or gunshot wounds.

Intelligence

It must be impressed upon units that it is mandatory that higher headquarters be k e p t f u l l y informed of enemy s t r e n g t h and capabilities at all times. This is particularly important during periods of enemy offensive action in order to meet each new enemy move with a prompt disposition of friendly forces.

Terrain

Experiences indicate that use of the fundamentals of cover, concealment, and the organization of high ground continues to insure friendly success with minimum casualties.

Patrol Missions

1. The mission assigned to a patrol should be simple and direct — one or two clear-cut points. All members of a patrol should be thoroughly aware of the patrol's mission and its importance.

2. Patrol missions must be carefully evaluated, particularly with regard to terrain and distance involved. Unduly long missions require rapid movement by motorized patrols and greatly increase the patrol's vulnerability to enemy ambush.

3. Long range patrols must be planned sufficiently in advance to permit establishment of advance bases from which support units can be p r o m p t l y dispatched in the event the patrol is ambushed or becomes cut off.

The 21st Infantry:

When the battle lines in Korea were stabilized in June 1951, the 21st Infantry occupied a prominent ridge line just south of Kumsong. Everyone in the Regiment felt they could take anything the enemy might give.

But some people questioned the wisdom of sitting on top of a ridge line. They wondered why the lines were not moved forward. The regimental commander felt considerable pressure from various sources — suggesting he move. To forestall any displacement forward from his ridge line he wrote to his division commander, Major General B. M. Bryan, who has given us permission to publish the following letter. The author asks that we make it quite clear that he does not contest doctrine. In his words, "our doctrine is sound — but I do contest deviations from established proven principles."



On Top of the Ridgeline

COLONEL GINES PEREZ



Korea
25 June 1951

Dear General Bryan:

There has been considerable discussion lately relative to the defense of forward slopes versus the crests of ridges. One argument

advanced for the defense of slopes has been that such a defense provides additional depth to the battle area. I do not agree with the above reasoning and would like to offer some practical reasons based on experience to justify my conclusions.

A good defensive position should include (and a commander must consider) fields of fire, obstacles, observation, covered routes of withdrawal and resupply. These factors are in addition to the principle one which every commander asks himself: if I must defend between my assigned two limiting points with a given force, how can I best employ that force?

In my opinion the answer is defense along the ridges (or just forward of the topographical crest). (See title page.) There must be suitable listening posts and other warning devices. Patrols must operate daily at different hours. There should always be fairly strong reserves, centrally located, if the terrain permits. There should also be wire, mines, trip flares, and finally, a fairly solid line tied in securely at the limiting points. This to my way of thinking is the best solution for this type terrain and enemy.

I do not believe in dispersing our forces or the use of perimeters in lieu of a solid line as a defense

against the human wave tactics currently employed by the enemy. The extensive dispersal of troops and the use of unrelated perimeters* at some distance from each other would permit the enemy to engulf each unit separately and might allow him to penetrate into the rear areas. In the event he penetrates and it becomes necessary to execute a withdrawal, it would be difficult or impossible to extricate the troops so employed. When we use the fire power available to us and have troops imbued with the proper spirit, the present enemy cannot push us off a ridge line when we are deployed on a reasonable frontage.

Fields of Fire

In ordinary terrain the best fields of fire can be obtained by defending along the bottoms of gentle slopes. This is especially true when the defended line is faced with flat or approximately flat terrain. Such a situation affords an opportunity for the employment of grazing fire in final protective lines and affords numerous other advantages.

However, this is not true on the terrain which we are presently required to defend. A perfunctory examination of almost any of our ridges will reveal that the best field of fire, they are never very good, can be obtained by emplacing our weapons slightly forward of the crest. In many cases the fields of fire available progressively decrease as we descend the slope until they finally disappear entirely when the bottom is reached.

Obstacles

I will treat obstacles only from the terrain standpoint and as they bear on the problem of "defense of crests versus forward slopes" in Korea. Looking at it from this narrow viewpoint, it can be said that most fighting men and many commanders consider a steep slope in front of them as a formidable obstacle in itself. The situation changes, especially psychologically, as the line is moved forward. When the line is moved forward, the men who do the shooting feel the *obstacle is behind them.* They feel it restricts the maneuverability of the defender. They constantly wonder if the enemy, by some means or other, may not gain the high ground behind them and thereby place the defenders at a disadvantage.

When the defenders are sitting on or near the crest of a ridge with a sharp slope to their front they enjoy both the physical and psychological advantages which accrue from occupying dominating terrain. They are "top dog" and the enemy is compelled to overcome, not only their fire power, but the very real obstacle of the ridge itself before he can come to grips with the defenders.

Observation

In this east central portion of Korea one ridge succeeds another. Consequently any ridge we choose to defend is usually faced with another of approximately the same elevation. If we assume that the enemy may (sooner than we think) have access to the next forward

*The use of "unrelated perimeters at some distance from each other" is contrary to the doctrine of position defense.

ridge, we would be surrendering the advantages accruing from observation if we move our line forward. The enemy could then observe our position and our movements if he chose to, and could prepare his attack plans accordingly.

Lines of Withdrawal and Resupply

A prudent commander must be prepared for all eventualities, even the singularly unpleasant — retrograde.* Obviously, for the reason cited in the preceding paragraph, this maneuver is greatly facilitated if it can be executed without hostile observation.

An important daily consideration is "how" to resupply our troops in rugged mountainous terrain. The solution has been found in the employment of Korean labor. The moment a line is moved forward of a ridge line, the effort required for resupply greatly increases. The carrying parties must then climb the ridge, descend to the other side, and then climb back out again.

*The possibility of a retrograde movement should not be a consideration in the selection of an MLR — The Infantry School.

Though I realize that this is not a major consideration, it is an additional burden that would probably require an increase in the number of laborers required to support a given operation. The same considerations apply equally, but with even greater emphasis, to the evacuation of wounded.

Frontages

I have already mentioned that the problem facing a commander on the defense will frequently resolve itself into how best to cover a given front with the forces at his disposal. Although the term "ridges" is used, it is recognized that a truly symmetrical ridge is the exception, and not the rule. Erosion frequently cuts these ridges so that the sides of the main ridge actually consist of a series of smaller ridges at approximately right angles to the main one, commonly known as "fingers." If it is agreed that the frontages assigned are usually in excess of what may be considered normal, then moving the line forward will not ease our problem. On the contrary, the distance to be defended will be materially increased. Since we are already over-extended, moving forward will merely add to the possibility of the enemy slipping through and gaining the high ground with greater ease. The answer used by many, that the reserve could occupy the high ground, is not a valid one. The reserve would have to be at least as large as the forward force itself to occupy *all* the high ground. This would be practically impossible in view of the forces available and the ground that must be covered. If the above could be accomplished, the reserve would then become the main force and our forward force would become an outpost line and we're right back where we started.

Depth

Depth in the battle area is brought about in several ways. First our air superiority and our ability to observe (Mosquitoes and liaison aircraft) deepen the battle area to our front. The enemy can be brought under our air attack long before he can bring his power to bear on our Infantry troops. The same can be said of our long range artillery and our 105-mm artillery. Our 4.2", 81-mm and 60-mm mortars, all contribute to the creation of depth forward. In rear of the MLR we have reserves and alternate positions.

In this particular situation our regiment has the equivalent of one battalion back, division has one regiment back, and corps has one division in reserve. This is real depth. In addition, we have the other prepared lines to fall back upon if necessary.

It appears to me that in this terrain the additional depth that might be gained by moving the line forward is very minor in comparison to the total depth just discussed, which we actually possess. I feel that one decieves himself to talk about depth when defending a ridge line barely wide enough to pitch a pup tent on.

Opinion of a Republic of Korea Division Commander

A KMAG Officer asked the commanding general of a certain Korean division, if, in his opinion, the American advisors had taught the ROK Army any tactics before the war which later proved unsound in combat. The Korean Gen-

eral's reply was: "Yes! We had been taught to defend a hill by placing the MGs near the bottom."* The North Koreans, who had evidently not heard of this principle, promptly seized the high ridges and forced the ROK Army to lose large quantities of weapons and suffer many casualties.

Dominant Terrain

In fighting the Chinese our offensives have been a series of battles for the dominant terrain the enemy defends so tenaciously. His battle positions are characterized by many emplacements along the crests and just forward of the ridge lines. I know of no instance wherein he has placed his main battle position at the base of the high ground he selected to defend.

The Regimental Position

For the reasons stated, I believe the present measures for defense employed by this regiment, although they can undoubtedly be improved in many respects, are the best under the circumstances. Were those who may disagree with me faced with the actual task of defending our position, and their own lives, I believe their overwhelming decision would be in favor of defending our ridge line.

Doctrine

I have never believed anything particularly new is being learned in Korea. Our basic doctrine, as taught in our Field Manuals, is sound. Field Manuals are of necessity written in general terms and cannot include all the variations of combat. In the face of special situations or when confronted with difficult terrain, we must not blindly seek solutions which may be in complete agreement with theory, but are not necessarily the best answer on the ground.*

Sincerely,

GINES PEREZ

Colonel, Infantry

Commanding

Thoughts After Combat

Now that you've read the letter, you'll recognize that it was never intended to be an academic dissertation for I had no references at hand to bolster my position. It represents my observations and ideas based on a very real situation involving my own troops and a determined enemy on terrain that proves the word "normal" should rarely be used. The end product of this experience is the letter, which as I now analyze it, tells the story of the use of a principle versus those who seek to apply rules.

Now take the location of an MLR for example. The principle is that we must locate and organize our MLR in order to obtain the best available grazing fire and block off enemy avenues of approach with

*It must be pointed out that the instruction given the ROKA general was either faulty or misunderstood. No one can ever lay down a blanket rule that machine guns will be located at any particular spot on every hill.

*Editor's Note: The author left the regiment in the last week of August 1951, and at that time the line had not been disturbed.

interlocking bands of fire and preplanned barrages. We also seek the longest possible fields of fire and observation, and we try to make maximum use of the terrain itself as an obstacle to enemy movement. This is a principle — NOT A RULE.

The Korean terrain is like an accordion — its hills are steep and the valleys between very narrow. Using the principle discussed — it is more advantageous in Korea to locate the MLR just forward of the crest in order to obtain the desired characteristics of an MLR. When we do this we provide longer fields of grazing fire and avoid firing "up the next hill." In most terrain more advantages accrue when we locate the MLR further down the slope of the hill. In short there is no rule of thumb applicable in all terrain and situations concerning the locations of the MLR.

Since returning to the states I have searched our manuals — and nowhere in our doctrine do we advocate blindly organizing the base of the high ground to be defended.

— The Author

The publication of this article is not to be interpreted as reflecting the thought of The Infantry School or the Infantry School *Quarterly*. — Editor's note.

Illustrated by C. G. Rebeles



Attention Commanders

EVERY DELINQUENCY REPORT that crosses a commander's desk carries three things in its wake: a disgruntled soldier, a harassed commander and a whale of a lot of paper work. All of which, I think you'll agree, is rather unfortunate because the work incident to handling such reports can scarcely be considered constructive. The man-hours involved might well have been profitably spent in some more worthwhile pursuit. In brief — a delinquency report means a lot of "wasted" time. And the soldier involved — have we really solved his problem? Or will he be a repeater?

I don't believe the solution to this business of delinquencies lies with finding quicker and easier methods of handling the paper work involved. I believe the only solution is one which will PREVENT delinquencies.

And so you say — "Why, commanders for years have worked along this line and have spent countless hours attempting to find the right answer." That's correct! However, I'd like to tell about a commander, here at Fort Benning, Georgia, who took very definite steps to make his men "conduct conscious" and thereby reduced delinquencies.

Before I move into this aspect of the matter, let's re-examine this business of delinquencies. What does the unarrested problem lead to? We know that it's reflected in decreased individual efficiency and unit effectiveness, lowered morale,

lost man-hours and a significant expenditure of your tax dollar and mine. Consider only the monetary angle for a moment. Last year the time lost to one major installation in dealing with AWOL's alone ran to $500,000 over a period of nine months.

Now the cost of delinquencies isn't felt by the Army alone. The individual also bears a part of the financial burden. For example, one city in a period of twelve months collected $20,000 in fines from 392 enlisted men from a nearby regiment. In this case the average cost to each soldier amounted to $51.

Aside from the cost, and the general unpleasantness and inconvenience, we are interested in this matter for other very valid reasons. We know that a high number of delinquencies is a fairly accurate indication that the morale of our unit is not all that might be expected. Low morale is generally a companion of an ill-disciplined unit, and together the two spell low individual efficiency. The end product of this combination is lowered unit effectiveness.

One Commander's Solution

Faced with exactly this problem the unit commander I mentioned earlier decided to make his men "conduct conscious" by letting the men carry the ball. The object was to PREVENT delinquencies, rather than wait and attempt a cure. He reasoned that the solution rested in the soldier's pride in himself, his fellow soldiers, and his unit. The commander then established a program based on this line of thought and designed to promote a sense of self-responsibility or "conduct consciousness" within each man.

More specifically, the purpose of the program is designed to achieve four things. They are:

1. Raise the standards of personnel conduct both on and off duty.
2. To improve individual effectiveness.
3. To reduce delinquencies.
4. To improve unit effectiveness.

A Pamphlet

To carry out the program, the commander had a pamphlet written and distributed to each subordinate unit. The purpose of this pamphlet was twofold.

1. It was a *guide* to be used by subordinate commanders in the conduct of their own programs.
2. It furnished material upon which to base conferences and discussions concerning the business of "conduct consciousness."

We'll not go into the entire pamphlet; it's a good deal too long for inclusion in this article, but I will discuss certain portions of it.

Let's start with the introduction to the pamphlet. Here the commander calls to everyone's attention that every soldier is a walking advertisement for his unit (and the Army), and that whatever he does creates some kind of impression on those around him. It also states that regardless of whether a man is drafted or is a volunteer — when he's in uniform he is a soldier, with a soldier's responsibility to himself and his country.

Next, the pamphlet deals with telling the individual *why* he should be concerned. This is explained by pointing out to each soldier his responsibility as a citizen, soldier, and taxpayer for his conduct during off duty hours.

The next section discusses the soldier's action and states, "The Army considers you men capable

of fighting and of protecting your country. The Army will treat you as a responsible person until *you* prove that it should do otherwise." The soldier is cautioned that the act of changing from civilian clothing to a uniform does not call for a change in behavior. Rather, it calls for a more responsible and dignified action on the part of the individual.

The fourth section offers suggestions as to what the soldier can do. The soldier is informed that "The Army asks nothing more than normal, decent, civilized conduct," and then leads logically to a discussion of "Specific Pointers" as to how this may be put into action. These pointers include Common Sense Courtesy, which is based on a consideration for others; Appearance; Respect for Women; Conduct in Public Places and on Public Carriers; and Drinking.

"Proper Action" is stressed in the last section which advises the soldier to do what he should and can to correct situations which are not in accord with good manners or military discipline. "This is everyone's responsibility regardless of his rank. A private can do more in many cases than an NCO or an officer."

The pamphlet also contains a recommended discussion outline for use by leaders in preparing for conferences.

Reminder Card

To further the program, a "reminder card" is attached to all copies of leave or pass orders given to soldiers. This card reads: "WHILE ON LEAVE YOU ARE A BILLBOARD FOR THE ARMY. BE COURTEOUS, ALERT, NEAT, RESPECTFUL, AND PROUD" and reminds the soldier of his responsibilities.

Interview Form

As a final step, each soldier, upon his return from leave, fills in an interview form on which he describes acts he observed which reflect discredit upon the service. This requirement, which is known by the soldier before his departure, acts to improve his own conduct through observation of others. The form also serves as an indication of the effectiveness of the entire program.

Presentation

The program may be presented during TI&E hours and through integration with other training, such as classes in military discipline and the reading of the required articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Signs and posters showing how to correctly wear the uniform, full length mirrors, and personal inspection have long been of assistance to commanders in keeping up the personal appearance of a unit. This in turn tends to raise morale and an individual's pride in himself. A soldier who is proud of himself *as a soldier* is less apt to get into trouble. These methods of preventing delinquencies should be retained.

Results

That the basic approach of the program is sound has been proven by other units stationed at Fort Benning when they have instituted their own programs. In all these cases, the basic principles outlined in this article have been followed, with some modification in approach, to fit the particular problems of these units. One unit has reported good results by introducing the program through its NCO organiza-

tions.

The recent origin of the program does not allow a statistical analysis of its effect upon the reduction of delinquencies, but early returns are reassuring.

Perhaps the most promising aspect of the program is the development of an awareness by soldiers of their responsibilities for maintaining the good will of the civilian populace through their conduct. Company commanders state that the influence of the program is felt not only in fewer DR's but also in higher standards of discipline during duty hours.

Now, I'm certain that all commanders recognize this program as one of applied leadership. The commander who originated this conduct consciousness program had in mind such items as motivation, competition and, in a sense, reward. He also knew his men and, while they may not all recognize it, was looking out for their welfare. Above all, he wasn't afraid to try a new approach.

Not long ago, Major General Robert N. Young, Commandant of The Infantry Center, had this to say by way of endorsing the program:

"The solution to this problem lies in developing an understanding on the part of both enlisted men and officers that the conduct of military personnel is not just the concern of the Army, but is equally the concern of each individual in the Army. The success of this program depends upon proper implementation and the wholehearted support of commanders at all levels."

Here is some material that may assist you in starting your own "Conduct Consciousness" Program:

DA Pamphlet 20-142, February 1952, Troop Topic, Subject: "The Soldier and the Community."

DA Pamphlet 20-145, April 1952, Subject: "The High Price of AWOL."

DA Pamphlet 21-41, February 1949, Subject: "Personal Conduct for the Soldier."

AFT 281 "The Standards of a Serviceman."

AFT 283 "The American Way of Life."

AFT 291 "American Citizenship and the Family."

AFT 422 "The Serviceman Goes to Town."

THAT YOU MAY LIVE!



Captain Ralph Tierno

Counterintelligence is military life insurance when it is remembered and used

A COMMANDER, regardless of the size of his unit, has a lot on his mind, but every so often, whether in a training situation or in combat, he has to take time out to do something. If he's like me his thoughts sometimes center around the time, energy and money that go into producing *one* first rate infantry soldier.

When one reduces this training into terms of man hours and equipment — it's almost staggering. As a company commander I often wondered how much of this training "took." What phase (s) did the individual soldier fail to apply? Getting an answer to these questions wasn't easy — but with time and combat I found an answer.

My experiences indicate that of all the training a soldier receives the one phase he is least likely to apply is counterintelligence. I've concluded that one reason for this may be found in the term "counter-intelligence" itself. It seemed to me, as I asked questions of various men, that the real meaning of the term and value of its application, had been missed. Because of this I started calling it "Keep it to yourself." I always explain that this means not only loose talk, but your activities and your unit. While this may not be an adequate substitute it does have the effect of putting the meaning across. It may be that Americans prefer simple, direct language.

Since the life of not one man but the lives of many depend on preventing information about us from falling into enemy hands "counter-intelligence" must be applied by everyone. By applying the "keep it to yourself" principle the enemy cannot easily determine our capabilities.

My approach — which comes a little later — has worked with me and with others. My thoughts on the matter are presented in conference form. This is done so that you can lift it out of the magazine and use it in training your own men. For the record, however, the material was not presented originally in conference form, but came into being a little at a time, as the need for it arose.

Conference

I handle the conference in the following manner and start it by asking:

What does the Enemy want to know about us? What questions does he want answered? Here they are:

1. **WHAT are we going to do?**
2. **WHEN are we going to do it?**
3. **WHERE are we going to do it?**
4. **In what STRENGTH will we do it?**

Each soldier possesses various bits

Title page illustrated by Pvt Jack Radcliff

of information the enemy needs to answer these questions. If we're training, any information that leaks regarding new training methods, weapons, equipment or doctrine is of value to the enemy. Why? Because mention of any of these may provide the enemy with one clue he needs to fully understand our methods or to anticipate (with a degree of certainty) future tactical actions or to evaluate new weapons and equipment. Any information the enemy gathers before a unit sails reduces every soldier's chance of survival. When you're en route to an overseas theater (or in one) the same caution applies.

Human Traits Responsible For Security Violations

Each of us has one or two outstanding traits. Some of us are conceited, others have an inordinate amount of faith in our friends, some among us are charged with enthusiasm, some of us are careless and a few are ignorant. Most of these are commendable traits, a few are not. Let's analyze each one of these in terms of violations of security. We'll see that traits normally classified as good can in s o m e case become a two-edged sword.

1. Conceit: The individual who wants to stress his own importance is generally regarded as conceited. He is the braggart, the so-called big shot who knows all the secrets. To prove he knows them he tells you all about them. He's the type individual an alien agent loves to meet. All you have to do to find out what he knows is listen. There may not be much that can be done about changing this character, but he can be taught to control his tongue and, of course, he must be kept in a position where he will learn nothing of value. This means that he will not get ahead in the Army — but then *he shouldn't.*

2. Faith: There's the individual who says, "Why sure I can trust old Bill, he won't violate my confidence," or "I can tell my wife anything, she won't tell anybody; half the time she won't even speak to me." We found that one of our greatest leaks during World War II was the result of officers and enlisted men talking to their wives. So remember — though we regard faith in our fellowmen as an extremely desirable thing — f a i t h must be tempered with the wisdom of experience. And e x p e r i e n c e teaches us that the only way to keep a secret is to keep it to ourselves.

3. Enthusiasm: Anyone who is really interested in his job finds it difficult not to talk and write about it. When his outfit has done particularly well his first impulse is to talk about it. He makes it easy for a clever person to get information. By flatly refusing to believe this type one needles him to the extent that he blurts out facts and figures to prove his point. Perhaps the one seeking information is so impressed with everything the enthusiastic type has to say that more and more is told. Or — the information seeker might well pose as an expert and involve Mr. Enthusiasm in a technical discussion in which he bubbles o v e r w i t h pride and trots out all the facts.

Ignorance: Some folks are so stupid they indulge in loose talk

because they know no better. This type gives away vital information because he has no knowledge of the way enemy intelligence works. He never realizes the importance of the information in his possession. Information is s e l d o m, if ever, wrapped in a neat package and delivered in a complete unit. Any small item of information may not be important all by itself, but the fragment supplied by an ignorant man coupled with others o f t e n furnishes the enemy with a complete picture.

5. Carelessness: No one knows how many times carelessness has contributed to the success of an enemy agent. There are agents operating in every country both in peace and war. An espionage agent is not the kind of individual that comes marching down the street saying, "Buddy, I want some information about so and so." Neither is he the movie version of a cloak and dagger man. He is usually a very ordinary looking individual and can easily be (though it's most unfortunate) a citizen of the U. S. It is hard to believe that anyone in this country would sell out and give information to the enemy. But s u c h people exist. Anytime we work with an individual using classified material, we must be sure to identify him first. Don't be embarrassed by asking him, "Mister, who are you? What's your name? Let me see your credentials. I want to know who you are."

Now the point is that each of us — before going any further must check himself. We must see if our outstanding trait, however good it may be, doesn't often lead us into divulging information. Once we've checked ourselves, then let's correct ourselves and not wait until it's too late.

Classified Documents

Documents, especially those of classified information, are always of interest to the enemy. In many cases they are number one targets. Keep in mind that documents are classified according to the degree of danger (or damage) they would cause this country if their contents were to reach enemy agents. If you have access to classified documents be certain that you thoroughly understand AR 380-5. (See Figure 1.)

It's easy for us to comprehend the almost irreparable damage that can be done to our nation and the Armed Forces when documents are compromised. However, we are prone to think in terms of State Department papers and high level Department of the Army documents. All too rarely does the Infantryman in combat remember that maps, overlays, written orders and equipment can be of tremendous immediate importance to the enemy. Your "harmless" diaries and letters are also "clue" sources when they fall into enemy hands.

During a recent visit to a hospital a sergeant, wounded in Korea, volunteered the following information: "I'm here because some character in my outfit went on patrol with a sketch of our company's position as well as a message book full of carbons, on his person. Somewhere along the line he lost the stuff. And somewhere a communist got hold of it, but what's more important, the commie read, understood and used the information.

We got clobbered. Sure the guy who lost the papers confessed. He was as worried as a man could be. And we beat the enemy off — but it could have been prevented if he'd thought before going on patrol."

Rumors

You may ask where rumors fit into the picture. Here's how — frequently there's an element of fact in a rumor, just enough to provide a clue. For example: Rumor (we'll assume) has it that the



DOCUMENTS

CLASSIFICATION	WHY CLASSIFIED ACCORDINGLY	AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY	DISSEMINATION
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION	GRAVE DAMAGE	ANY GENERAL OFFICER	ONLY THOSE WHOSE DUTIES REQUIRE IT
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION	ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY		
CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION	PREJUDICIAL TO INTERESTS OF THE U.S.A.	ANY COMMISSIONED OFFICER	
RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY		
CONFIDENTIAL	INVESTIGATIONS AND MATTERS OF A DISCIPLINARY NATURE ONLY		
RESTRICTED			

READ AR 380—5

— Pvt Vincent J. Cafarell

Figure 1.

(This may sound basic, but I am always amazed at the number of people who are careless about this aspect of security.)

A Infantry Division is going overseas next week. Now the fact is that A Infantry Division is not going overseas for six weeks, but B

Infantry Division is departing next week. The reason for not repeating rumors becomes apparent instantly. The enemy may be confused as to the division's identity, but he does know that an additional force will soon be in combat. The enemy then takes every possible action to prevent the division's arrival. Rumors of this type can reduce an individual's chance of survival.

Rumors of a different type can have an adverse effect on morale. Rumors such as the one started about 12 August 1950 in Korea which claimed "the war will be over in ten days" are particularly vicious.

A corporal who recently returned from Korea tells this one about a rumor: "In November of 1950, when we were in North Korea — the home-going rumor got started. It was so strong that everyone started packing his gear. We even let down on guarding our area to the point where we had about one guard to each platoon."

This type of rumor tends to build up false hopes and creates a letdown when proven untrue which often lowers morale and decreases combat efficiency. A good reason for never repeating rumors.

The same thing applies to rumors that one frequently meets while in training. The variety that state: "We're going to Korea," "We're going to Europe," "Tomorrow we leave on a secret mission," or the so-called authoritative species such as, "I hear the old man believes we'd better ship our families home next Friday, because we're departing a week from Wednesday." Most or all of these are based on wishful thinking and only serve to confuse, disrupt and demoralize troops.

There's the fright type wherein someone says: "The enemy has a secret weapon he intends to use on us." When you hear rumors of this or any other type — don't repeat them. If they stimulate your curiosity ask someone in authority for the facts.

If You're Captured

Not one of us anticipates capture, but any one of us might sometime find himself a prisoner of war. If this happens — it's the one time in our lives that we should forget our right of freedom of speech and give an imitation of the clam. The enemy, however, will use clever methods to try to make you talk.

This whole matter received close attention during World War II when the then War Department published the following in Combat Lessons (Edition 3):

"Our men talk when captured. Perhaps not so much as the Germans but still too much. I have talked to three men of the division who were captured during the landing at SALERNO and who escaped several weeks later and returned to our lines. They said they were led back some distance from the front and then halted. Suddenly someone said in perfect English, 'All A-Company men line up here, B-Company over here,' and so on. They were completely taken in and lined up as directed before they realized they were being tricked into giving away information.

"Later when one of the men refused to answer questions asked

by a German officer the latter said, 'You damned fool, do you think you are keeping something from us? Your company commander's name is G....., your first sergeant's name is I....., and your squad leader's name is J....., Isn't that right?' The soldier said he couldn't keep from nodding his head in agreement since the officer had correctly named all three of them."

Returnees from Korea who had been captured tell us that the enemy hasn't changed his methods. If anything, he indicates more skill and uses better methods of trying to make persuasive talk.

Don't forget — all you have to give your captors is your *name, rank, service number* and *date of birth*. If you say any more the enemy is quite likely to use the information to his advantage against your own unit.

Signal Security

Since we are not a people harassed by wire tapping secret police, it's difficult for us to understand the necessity for signal security. Remember — in combat the enemy is always listening.

In 1943 a War Department Training Bulletin presented a warning that applies today:

"Think next time.

"Frequently information is imparted to the enemy by an untrained radio operator. The following incident occurred in one outfit, and probably has happened in numerous others.

"The scene of this short story is a combat zone where violations of transmission security may be measured quickly in terms of casualties. PFC Y, an untrained radio operator, unwittingly notified the enemy (as well as our own forces) — by first identifying each unit in the clear before using their current call sign.

"Obviously, the call signs were compromised before ever being put to use."

In World War II this became such a problem that a training bulletin listing the most flagrant violations was published. Briefly — it stated the following:

"Don't endanger your unit by —

1. Transmitting in the clear without proper authority.

2. Chatting (conversing with other operators and unwittingly giving the enemy information concerning plans, movements or dispositions.)

3. Breaking radio silence.

4. Sending unauthorized communications.

5. Using improper radio procedure."

OCAFF Bulletin 4, 24 May 1952, indicates that the lessons of World War II have not yet been applied. The bulletin says:

"Violations of Signal Security.

"A decided lack of telephone and radio security was noted. . . The uncanny accuracy with which the enemy used his troops and artillery during the time our units were being relieved indicated there were strong security leaks in our system. Careless communications security cost lives in battle."

Censorship

We not only tend to talk too much, but we also write too much. Naturally we want to keep the folks at home abreast of our progress, but not to the detriment of our unit. We never know when

apparently innocent or what seems to be useless information about ourselves or our unit will fall into enemy hands. The folks at home wouldn't deliberately give information to the enemy, but they do talk. And in talking they frequently ly provide the one or two pieces of news needed to round out the picture of your unit.

Here's a quotation from a Canadian Training Memorandum that puts the bee on the crux of the problem:

"Wives are a real worry to us. Apparently their husbands feel free to tell them more military information than they tell their men. There was a glaring example of this recently when a large troop movement and offensive operation was projected. At least two weeks before the troops completed their training and began to move, several wives had written their mothers giving them complete details of the proposed operation. They told far more than any officer or man had written and usually added a post script that the information was SECRET and not to be passed on. If trained military men had not seen fit to keep the information to themselves, how secure would it be in the hands of worried mothers-in-law."

If you remember to write home only information that can be of no value to the enemy — you've imposed self censorship. If everyone did this, there would be no need for officially censoring m il.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment in Korea started an effective campaign. In this battalion they tried the slogan "WRITE HOME ALL YOU WANT THE ENEMY TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR UNIT." Every member of the battalion was told that if any doubt existed as to what was authorized for home consumption — he should ask his commander.

Remember — when you're in doubt, *don't write!*

Combat

In battle* it's imperative that we remember how to use cover and concealment, how to report information to your unit leaders, and how to camouflage your person and position. (See Figure 2.)

In the early phase of the Korean War a member of the 1st Battalion 5th RCT (September 1950), on duty at an observation post, reported that he had spotted a suspected enemy observation post. The battalion was attacking in the general direction of this location. Fortunately this observer reported the information accurately and quickly. Before the enemy could take advantage of his observation our artillery had knocked the OP out, thereby denying the enemy observation over our attack. This can be considered a positive example of counterintelligence.

By reporting unusual enemy activity, enemy patrols or enemy observation posts — quickly (and accurately), action can be taken to neutralize these information gath-

*FM 21-75, Combat Training of The Individual Soldier and Patrolling.

A GOOD SOLDIER ALWAYS:

1. AVOIDS MOVEMENT THAT WILL DISCLOSE HIS POSITION PREMATURELY.
2. USES ALL AVAILABLE CONCEALMENT.
3. OBSERVES FROM A PRONE POSITION.
4. AVOIDS EXPOSING ITEMS THAT GLISTEN.
5. KEEPS OFF THE SKY LINE.
6. ATTEMPTS TO BREAK UP THE OUTLINE SHADOW, TEXTURE AND COLOR OF AN OBJECT.
7. TAKES ADVANTAGE OF ALL AVAILABLE NATURAL CONCEALMENT AND COVER.
8. AVOIDS THE USE OF TOO MUCH CAMOUFLAGE.
9. REMEMBERS TO IMPOSE CAMOUFLAGE DISCIPLINE UPON HIMSELF.
10. REPORTS INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AT ONCE.

Figure 2

ering agencies.

Preparation for Battle

Another aspect of "Keeping it to yourself" is illustrated in the individual's preparation for an attack or a patrol, or even a defensive position. Such items as letters (with their revealing addresses, names and incidents), personal papers, photographs and documents, if they should fall into his hands, will provide the enemy with valuable information. For this reason such things must be left behind. Not thrown away, but left with the individual designated to care for such items.

A company commander recently said: "My experience with a company in Korea convinces me that you have to prepare your unit properly for action to prevent anything from possibly providing the enemy with information. We always had a letter burning after mail call. By doing this — no matter what happened there were no leaks, and the only forms of identification on any of us were our dog tags and identification cards."

An example of why these precautions are necessary is the case of a prisoner taken by one of our units in Korea. The particular prisoner had several letters and documents on his person. After translation, our forces knew the strength of his unit and had gained considerable information regarding its capabilities since one of the papers gave in detail the action participated in by the prisoner's organization.

Had this PW been an American who had forgotten to leave his papers behind and his captor Chinese, the enemy would have gained the same advantage that accrued to us. Again — if in doubt about what to carry — leave it behind.

That You May Live

Everything we've discussed, if applied, enhances your opportunity to accomplish the job every Infantryman is trained to do. As an individual these things provide *military life insurance*, but only if we remember that "Keeping it to yourself" must become second nature for all of us.

The genius of a good leader is to leave behind him a situation which common sense, without the grace of genius, can deal with successfully.

— Walter Lippmann

Illustration on page 76 by Pvt Jack Radcliff

A Combat Captain Speaks

CAPT. JOHN HUGHES

✔ "Here are some combat lessons I learned in Korea. Since you may be on your way over . . ."

Dear Bill:

Here are some combat lessons I learned in Korea. Since you are on your way over I have outlined them for you in hopes that they will be of some use. These lessons are based on my own experience as a rifle company commander in Korea. Remember, I am speaking only from my own experience.

The comments on tactics usually apply both to the North Koreans and the Chinese. In cases where this is not true, I'll make a special note as to how they differ. All of my comments refer to the rifle company and its direct support elements.

First let me mention two factors that you will have to apply both to the defense and the attack at all times under any combat conditions. They are full use of fire power, and fire control through an adequate communication system. Without these, a rifle company becomes just a group of men almost completely ineffective and of no use to anyone, including themselves.

Of the two factors, fire control is by no means to be considered the less important. Uncontrolled fire power is too often wasted fire power. For example: a lone enemy soldier approaching your position should be fired at by only one or two men, *not* a whole platoon or a whole company; and an enemy force of fifteen or twenty men approaching your right flank requires the direct fire of only your right flank rifle platoon and not the uncontrolled fire of the entire company. Fire control will prevent premature firing during the day and careless, fear-inspired fire at night. Controlled fire by the men in my company once stopped an enemy battalion (-) that attacked our position.

Use your CP as a fire direction center and a place to evaluate the situation confronting your company. You can't do this without an adequate communications system.

You and your men *MUST* become experts in terrain description, target designation and evaluation of enemy sounds, movements and visual signals. Use your CP party, communication section, runners and platoon leaders to aid in evaluating the situation and to relay your orders.

Grenades

The grenade is the best personal weapon to use against strange sounds and suspicious movements. Encourage your men to use them freely at night. Use them when inspecting a cave or hole. Throw in a grenade — then look to see what is inside. (One time a platoon sergeant and I got eleven enemy this way that had been bypassed by the men ahead of us.)

Enemy Artillery And Mortar Fire

Enemy artillery and mortar fire must almost be a direct hit to kill you in a rice paddy or on soft ground. You can move through or around it by walking in the mud and water of a paddy, or ignore it if it's falling in a rice paddy near your position.

Platoon Personality

Realize early that your platoons rapidly develop a personality exactly like their platoon leader or platoon sergeant. For special missions remember this fact in deciding which platoon to use for the job. If a platoon leader is aggressive, his platoon will be the same. If the platoon leader is cautious, careless or slow you can wager his men will be similar. When you have platoon leaders that are clever, aggressive, and careful, you can consider yourself a fortunate man.

Signal Equipment*

When you have all the communication equipment you can carry, you will have just about enough. Offhand, I would recommend: twelve sound power phones, seven SCR 300's, four EE 8's, six SCR 536's and all the light telephone wire you can use on an extended front position. Organize a communication section out of some of the fillers in company headquarters. Make the communication chief one of your trusted assistants.

Make the Load Light

Never have your men carry more than is absolutely necessary. This sounds like a simple thing to remember, but many commanders forget. The penalty is tired men at a critical time. At the very most, allow only a light combat pack, poncho, entrenching tool, ammunition, part of the individual mess gear, grenades, and individual weapons. Frankly, I can see no use for the combat pack or mess gear. For example: you can break down a razor, shorten the handle of a toothbrush, pick up a small piece of C-ration soap, add a couple of razor blades, and put the whole works in a first aid pouch and hook it on your belt. An Infantryman doesn't have to have a towel in summer. In winter the issue OD towel can be used as a scarf and a bath cloth. Carry an extra pair of socks in your pocket.

Chow

Let your men carry a spoon in their pocket and turn in most of the knives and forks to the S4. Have the mess sergeant carry all the company's mess gear with the kitchen equipment. If the mess sergeant can bring hot chow to you, he can also bring the clean mess gear for everyone in the company at the same time. You don't need to saddle your men with mess gear when they are on a diet of C-rations. In those rare instances when the chow doesn't reach you

*Editor's Note: The present authorization is two (2) radio sets AN/PRC 10, two (2) EE 8 telephones, twelve (12) radio sets AN/PRC-6 and four (4) reels of wire WD-10TT. It should be pointed out that on the defensive, additional communications equipment is sometimes necessary, while on the offensive, units will generally find the extras unnecessary and possibly a burden to carry.

because of the enemy or terrain, it's a burden to have mess gear in your pocket or combat pack.

Impress your mess sergeant and cooks with the importance of their job. Tell them what good food means to the company. To you, that kitchen is just as important as a platoon of riflemen and a dozen machine guns. Get the whole kitchen crew on the team. Teach them to work for "their" company. Some of the finest and bravest men I saw in Korea were mess sergeants and cooks.

This may sound elementary, but for heaven's sake let your mess sergeant run his kitchen and everything associated with it. Back him up and deal directly with him. Whenever there's a misunderstanding over ration breakdown or cooking schedule, be prepared to go to bat for him with the S4. Let your mess sergeant know that you expect him to get the chow to you even if he and the cooks have to put on "A" frames and carry it up the hill. A good crew will do this for their company without the commander even mentioning it.

Supply

Here is a department that can cause you a lot of trouble and worry if things aren't taken care of carefully. *Watch* overload and excess; frequent inspection of all the men and use of the supply truck will eliminate these. Remember one thing: when men are fighting they don't have time to give a hoot about excess equipment.* Why should they? Now, it's a different story with essential equipment, and this men instinctively understand. I would recommend that you use what we called the stock supply system. First get all the stuff out of duffle bags. Take the full field and combat pack from your men as well as all bedding and bed rolls. When you've done this have the supply sergeant carry enough stock to take care of the following:

(1) shoes
5% of the unit strength

(2) fatigues
50 to 100% of unit strength

(3) socks
100% of unit strength

(4) extra weapons
5% of T/O&E allotment

(5) web equipment
5% of unit strength

This system was used by my company in Korea and found to be very efficient. All webbing and weapons stocks were furnished from men KIA or WIA.

Keep the men light and constantly cut down on the excess load forced on the supply sergeant. He can turn in all his extra supplies one day and two days later have extras because of the stuff he will pick up while conducting his own salvage program.

*Editor's Note: This is not under any circumstances to be construed as condoning loss or waste of equipment and supplies on the battlefield. The individual soldier must be thoroughly imbued with supply discipline. Commanders must be constantly alert for ways to conserve property and to prevent loss of valuable and expensive equipment. Planning is the answer. As indicated in the above article, give the men only the items they will need for a particular operation. Turn in or safeguard items not needed. Follow up with a thorough salvage plan for the battlefield. Today's so-called "excess" may be the means of turning the tide of tomorrow's battle. Be supply economy minded.

As you know, bedding or individual rolls will arrive with the evening meal and be carried back to the trains area after breakfast. However, I think it's significant to point out that many times you will want only enough bed rolls on position to take care of 50 per cent of your company as a means of keeping 50 per cent of the company awake at all times. Some nights you won't want any sleeping bags in the area. You'll need everybody awake all night. This applies in winter as well as summer.

I realize that the impetus of supply is from rear to front and that stocks of clothing and equipment are supposed to be maintained in the regimental trains area and not by individual companies. Don't forget I am speaking only of my own experiences.

The Unit Administrator

Now here is a new addition to the rifle company T/O that will prove invaluable to you. If I should write all the things the unit administrator did in my company, this letter would be about nothing else. However, I will just mention a few of the more important things. He should travel with the kitchen and supply section to supervise their work. His greatest service to you, however, will be in handling all official correspondence. This is nearly a full-time job. Let him obtain the information needed by the regimental personnel officer to correct individual or personnel records. Allow time and transportation for the many trips he will be required to make back to the personnel section to expedite his duties. He can greatly assist you by advising enlisted personnel on such matters as savings,

war bonds, insurance, family allotments and related matters. When he is designated by competent authority he can act as agent finance officer or witnessing officer to expedite the payment of troops. He can also perform a great service by checking your supply records and inventories. He can assist you in answering much of the mail received from the parents and relatives of men in your company. When you have a large amount of this type correspondence, he can write a complete letter based on your draft or notes. When it's necessary he can also help censor company mail. You should also require him to accompany the mess sergeant to your forward position at least once a day in order to maintain daily liaison with you.

The Enemy's Attack

When I was there, he usually attacked at night, most often after 2400 hours. Much of the time he would hit our front and try to drive straight through. Because of the different uniforms, nationality, color or language of the UN units, it is easy for the enemy to locate a limiting point between major units and that is where he will strike with his strongest forces. He will use horns, bugles, signal flares and a variety of sounds to control his maneuver. Use this knowledge yourself and have it given to your replacements as soon as they arrive to enable them to better understand the enemy.

If some day just after sundown, you hear a rooster crowing to your front and you can't see any chickens, rest assured that that rooster is an enemy squad leader calling his chickens to an assembly point for an attack on your position that night. The same applies to the croaking of frogs and chirping of crickets and a few other sounds. I confirmed this when my company was attacked by Chinese chickens, crickets and frogs one night (we won).

The first wave of enemy will usually be after your crew-served weapons and trying to locate fox holes. This wave will not be particularly interested in attacking key or critical terrain. The first wave will consist largely of grenadiers and men armed with small automatic weapons. The build-up of heavier individual weapons and machine guns will follow in succeeding waves. Waves of enemy will come straight at you regardless of the cost to them until you kill or wound the majority of them.

Hand grenades should be used extensively against the first wave. They will not disclose positions and if enough are used may well break up the attack. Crew-served weapons should not fire at the first wave if at all possible. To fire will disclose their positions. Remember — the main mission of the first wave is to locate crew-served weapons.

The most enemy assaults I experienced in any one battle was five over a period of six hours (0130 to 0730). They are usually supported by *Long Range* heavy machine gun fire initially, but their heavy machine guns join them early in the assault. I estimated it to be the third wave when they tried to pull heavy machine guns (Russian MARX on wheels) right on my position. Light machine gunners are in the early waves (proba-

bly first or second) and will attempt to deliver "marching" fire on you as they approach. The enemy attack will be supported by artillery and mortars. I was impressed by his frequent inability to adjust and shift fire rapidly and accurately. Don't get the idea, however, that he can't deliver accurate fire. He can and does.

Should the enemy, especially the Chinese, get into your position or succeed in pushing back any part of your position, capitalize on the fact that he doesn't know how to exploit any initial success very rapidly, if at all. (I think the exploitation is assigned to the waves that follow.) I would say without hesitation, that as far as your counterattack is concerned, the time factor in the execution of it is more important than the size of the force you use. I participated in a counterattack against Chinese who had overrun a small party from my company. We counterattacked quickly with a small force and successfully overcame the enemy — who was merely standing around making a lot of conversation.

Your Defense

I found that we usually had a wide front in every sense of the word and, as a result, I had to concentrate on all-around defense. It was this extremely wide defense sector that drove home the importance of full utilization of fire power and fire control through communications. I have mentioned these points again only to emphasize them fully. I am thoroughly convinced that the doctrine and principles found in our manuals and taught in our schools are sound. They will apply to any situation in Korea, provided technical know-how and leadership are present. Stick to the basic principles and

you will avoid problems. However, I would like to pass on a couple of lessons that helped me and seemed to work very well. Let's take a few of the weapons:

3.5 Rocket Launcher

My men used the 3.5 rocket launcher as an antipersonnel weapon and found it exceedingly effective against groups of enemy personnel. Its great blasting and killing power also helped create the impression of incoming supporting artillery. This tended to discourage the enemy. My men liked it so well they carried it on patrols. It's scarcely necessary to say that the 3.5 rocket launcher is an effective close-in fighting weapon.

Rifle Grenade

I like to have the rifle grenadiers of the support elements fire overhead fire and place grenades in front of the forward elements when the front is under attack. I think it's important at night to have grenadiers fire from defilade positions, or from positions on a reverse slope.

60-mm Mortars

Whether you employ them in battery or singly, the most important factor in the use of the 60-mm mortars is flexibility through fire control. Make sure your communication system will permit you to furnish mortar fire across your entire front and all around if necessary.

57 Recoilless Rifle

In my opinion, this is an ideal Infantry weapon and perfectly suited for either day or night employment. I would suggest you strongly emphasize alternate and supplementary positions. In most cases I found it best to attach these weapons to platoons. When firing it at night make certain of your target and then let her "wham" away.

Light Machine Guns

Make sure the crews dig good gun emplacements and have plenty of grenades for self-protection. If at all possible get some extra LMG's . I'd recommend a total of nine. Don't forget to have plenty of ammunition on position.

Heavy Machine Guns* and 75 Recoilless Rifle from Weapons Company

Due to rugged terrain and wide frontages these will frequently be attached to you in the defense as well as the attack. Make sure there is plenty of ammunition on the heavy machine gun positions regardless of whether they are attached or in direct support. When walking the company perimeter or MLR, draw a pencil sketch of the terrain and all machine gun positions. This procedure will enable you to double check your bands of fire and determine whether or not there is full coverage of the area.

*The Infantry School recommends that when attacking a distance of over 500 yards, the light machine gun be used in lieu of the heavy machine gun.

The 75 Recoilless Rifle is a good friend. Be sure and have plenty of WP ammunition to mark targets for air strikes and keep sufficient antipersonnel ammunition on hand. When firing at the rapid rate, guard against overheating. Alternate and supplementary positions apply to the 75 as well as the 57. As a rule I would not advise firing it at night except when enemy pressure forces you.

However, I might pass on several tips. Place the weapon close to a burning building or village when possible. If you do this you can fire during the night without any hesitation. When occupying a blocking position in which a friendly force is driving the enemy toward you, use a BAR "Killer" team to cut down the enemy as they attempt to escape the impact and accuracy of recoilless rifle fire.*

Forward Observers

See that all your forward observers are not operating from the same OP and that you maintain communication at all times with each of them. When setting up a new defense, have each of your FO's register first and then immediately plot all concentrations on every map in the company. If you're short of maps, make sketches and plot your concentrations on them.

Your Attack

I found it best to attack in column much of the time. It's wise, I think, to have one FO accompany your lead platoon leader. I think it's obvious that you should rotate the artillery, 4.2, and 81 FO's on this job. This also applies to the rifle platoons. It's an important matter and I suggest you check it yourself.

The worst thing you or your platoon leaders can do is to get in a great big hurry. A hasty advance prior to reaching the assault position invites disorder, confusion, and tired men at the wrong time and can result in a completely ineffective organization.

Take good care of the heavy machine gunners and 75-recoilless sections that might be attached to you in the attack. Don't let either of them travel with the same platoon all day. When they reach a position from which they can cover your advance to the next objective, let the lead platoon leave them. Have the second platoon pass through and then have them join the third for movement to the objective. In plain words, you can't push these men all day as you can a rifleman. You must take advantage of every opportunity to let them grab a few minutes rest at a point where they can still cover your advance effectively. I prefer the 57 recoilless in the attack over the 75. My opinion is influenced by the difference in weight and ammunition requirements of the two weapons.

In your attack order, provide for instructions for reorganization on the objective. Nothing makes an order more vague than poor terrain description. I would recommend that you practice and develop a simple routine procedure for

*Fire delivered by the 75 is so effective (and accurate) you can afford to risk disclosing their position at night if a target appears.

describing routes, objectives, reference points, and similar things.

When your men capture an enemy soldier make certain they place a piece of paper or tag in his pocket stating the designation of the capturing unit, the exact time and place of capture. Get the prisoner to the rear as soon as possible. This is extremely important to you because the interrogation team at regiment will be able to tie down the exact location or unit affected by any "hot" information obtained from the prisoner. I have seen this system locate enemy machine guns and strong points directly in front of a rifle company in time for them to avoid disaster.

The Enemy's Defense

I found the enemy used deep holes, overhead cover, and lots of connecting trenches. In my opinion, the Chinese were better at this than the North Koreans. The Chinese would have his main defenses near the base of a forward slope with his reserves and OP's near the military crest. The North Koreans seemed to locate defenses on higher ground with strong points forward to execute a delaying action. I was impressed by the poor manner in which the North Koreans employed machine guns. They seemed to have only one direction of fire and were not tied in closely with adjacent guns. All in all, I consider the North Korean a much better fighter than the Chinese.

In closing, I want to emphasize the fact that I am convinced beyond any doubt, that an American rifle company can lick a battalion of North Koreans or Chinese any place, any time in Korea.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN

Humility must always be the portion of any man who receives acclaim earned in the blood of his followers and the sacrifices of his friends.

— President Dwight D. Eisenhower

The New 81-mm Mortar

MAJOR JOHN J. MORGAN



Figure 1. 81-mm Mortar, M-1 (left). 81-mm Mortar, M-29 (right).

THE 81-MM MORTAR, M-1, has served the Infantry well, both in World War II and in Korea. Efficient though it has been, this combat veteran now has to step aside for its more efficient successor, the recently standardized 81-mm Mortar, M-29*. The production model of this new medium mortar somewhat resembles its older

*The new 81-mm Mortar, M29, will replace the 81-mm Mortar, M1. No statement can be made at this time as to when the new mortar can be expected to be delivered to units.

brother (Figure 1) but includes all of the following new features:

1. The one-piece, smooth bore, steel barrel (M29) is grooved to reduce weight without loss of strength.

2. The yoke assembly of the bipod (M-23A1) now has a circular opening designed to receive the barrel. This feature replaces the saddle and clamping collar of the M4 bipod. A single, overhead, compression spring type shock absorber is mounted onto this yoke assembly. (See Figure 2.)

3. The mount attachment ring, which serves to secure the barrel to the bipod, threads onto the grooves of the barrel. In firing, this ring should be located between 17 to 23 inches from the muzzle. These limits are distinctly marked on the surface of the barrel. In mounting the mortar, the ring should be positioned some 18 inches from the muzzle with its projecting lug upward so that the shock absorber clevis can be connected to the lug by means of a lock pin once the barrel is housed within the yoke assembly. (See Figure 3.) Although removable, the ring remains on the barrel when the mortar is dismounted.

4. During recoil, the barrel is free to move rearward within the circular opening of the yoke. The mount attachment ring, threaded to the barrel, also moves rearward and draws the shock absorber shaft with it which in turn compresses the recoil spring. During counter-recoil the spring expands and returns the yoke and barrel to battery.

5. In dismounting the mortar, the shock absorber clevis is secured to the projecting lug on the rear side of the guide tube by means of the

Figure 3. Mount attachment ring, correctly positioned.

lock pin. (See Figure 4.) This lock pin attached to the shock absorber shaft by a small chain, serves to secure the shock absorber to the mount attachment ring for firing as well as to the guide tube for transport.

6. The elevating screw is enclosed in a sleeve which protects the screw from sand and dust.

7. The rear sides of the circular bipod feet have been cut off to provide better seating qualities, particularly when the mortar is fired at the lower elevations from a position on a soft surface.

8. The steel baseplate (M23A1) is a circular, two-piece unit, 22¾ inches in diameter, with a U-shaped rotating socket assembly which secures the barrel to the baseplate and permits the mortar to be rotated through 360° of traverse without moving the baseplate. A nylon carrying handle is provided for both units of the baseplate. The cross-leveling mechanism of the M1 mortar has been retained on this new mortar though the locking nut has been flanged to provide better leverage for locking and unlocking.

Figure 2. Yoke assembly of the bipod (M23A1).

Location of the mount attachment ring on the barrel and distance of the bipod legs from the baseplate affect the limits of elevation and traverse of this mortar and vary the ratio of mils per turn of the elevating crank and traversing handwheel. Depending upon these

factors, the M23A1 bipod provides:

1. Approximately 150 to 200 mils total traverse.
2. A total of 19 complete turns of the handwheel between extreme limits of traverse.
3. An average of approximately 9 mils traverse per complete turn of the traversing handwheel.
4. Approximately 40 to 85 degrees elevation.
5. A total of 53 complete turns of the elevating crank between minimum and maximum elevation.
6. An average of approximately 10 mils elevation per complete turn of the elevating crank.

Mortar equipment, including the M4 sight, and all existing 81-mm mortar ammunition authorized for use with the M1 mortar may be used with the M29 mortar.

For man portability, the M29 mortar may be broken down into four loads with the barrel, bipod, and both units of the baseplate each comprising one man-carried load.

A one-piece, circular, lightweight baseplate which it is anticipated will replace the two-piece baseplate, will achieve a further reduction of 23 pounds in the weight of the medium mortar, further facilitating man portability.

The new medium mortar offers improved overall performance. Its primary advantages include: Reduced weight; better stability due to baseplate design; greater accuracy with the HEL Shell, especially at longer ranges; and 360° traverse without moving the baseplate. The new mortar also increased the useable ranges to 4000 yards with the HEL Shell, due to ability to withstand increased chamber pressures when fired with charges 7 and 8.

All of the improvements found on the new medium mortar will greatly increase its combat value and assure it of a warm welcome by Infantrymen.

The complete weight of the M29 mortar is considerably less than the M1 mortar:

Component	M29	M1
Barrel	28	44.5
Bipod	40	47
Baseplate	47	45
Outer section	23	
Inner Section	24	
TOTAL	115	136.5

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Rugged and Ready

LT JOSEPH WINDSOR

✔ Ranger training is an investment that pays dividends in leadership

EARLY AFTER DARK on 9 February 1952, a band of some 50 heavily armed men bent on a mission of destruction slipped from a shrimp boat off the coast of Florida, boarded five-man canvas boats and fought their way through a stubborn surf to shore.

Carefully hiding their small crafts, the invaders cunningly evaded detection along the beach, although they landed near a resort-lined area. Then they worked their way inland unnoticed, despite a moonlight night.

Through the night they stealthily crept cross-country toward their objectives — one group heading for an airfield on which were located several aircraft and the other to a spot where there were 12 artillery guns. Both objectives were some eight miles from the patrol's landing position.

At dawn they were at their destination and lost no time in striking. At the airfield the planes were destroyed by TNT. The field's control tower was demolished and several guards were knocked out. The second raiding party blasted the artillery pieces at its objective and also neutralized a number of men.

Departing undetected the marauders moved into a clandestine bivouac deep in the thick swamps where they remained all during daylight hours without being discovered. While bivouaced they bodily evacuated their wounded by helicopter and scrounged food off the countryside.

Two weeks later the troublemakers were active in North Georgia. There a patrol of 24 TNT-laden men made it way over 30 miles of the toughest mountain country in the state and was hiding out on a peninsula jutting out into the Tennessee Valley Authority's Blue Ridge Dam Reservoir. There the interlopers secured five flat-bottomed boats from fishermen and paddled silently under cover of darkness two miles across the reservoir. Their objective was to put the electricity-producing plant out of action. Knocking out the guards, the group dashed into the vitals of the installation and quickly placed the TNT where it would do the most harm to the highly-intricate mechanisms. Meanwhile other raiders were neutralizing nearby transformers.

When the charges were set off and the leader was satisfied that they had wrought sufficient damage to the vital plant, he ordered his men to paddle back across the reservoir and slip into friendly territory.

Since that cold February night at least 17 other marauding bands have landed in Florida and caused havoc in the Southeast. Yet why have these incidents gone unnoticed in our nation's newspapers? Here's why. . . these men are not enemy saboteurs but highly skilled U. S. Army personnel undergoing Ranger training at The Infantry School's Ranger Department.

Hmmm! — Very interesting — someone says. But what's the purpose of this Ranger training? How will such men benefit my command? For the answers — just keep on reading.

Today's Ranger

The purpose of today's Ranger Course as designated by the Department of the Army is as follows: ". . . to develop to the maximum, by practical field training, the potential military command and leadership of selected small unit leaders who, upon being returned to their units, will improve training capabilities, command, and leadership by example and instruction."

The Ranger trained at The Infantry School belongs to no special unit. Instead his knowledge and skills are applied within a standard Infantry division. The commander who sends an officer or noncommissioned officer to Benning for Ranger training DOES NOT LOSE HIM.

Upon completion of the eight weeks Ranger Course, the graduate returns to his unit. He returns as a first rate Infantryman — not a specialist in the sense that a radio operator is a specialist — but an Infantry specialist in the broadest sense. The course might well be termed an Infantry post graduate course — for only first rate students with the necessary prerequisites are accepted and only the best graduate. It is noteworthy that out of 636 students entering the first seven classes 161 were rejected within a few days after arrival because they lacked these prerequisites. Once a student graduates his commander has a man capable of instructing and

demonstrating, but above all, he has acquired a leader.

High Standards

It's time we became more specific and actually revealed the prerequisites necessary for attending the Ranger Course. They are:

Officers and Noncommissioned Officers

1. Must be volunteers.

2. Must be under 33 years of age.

3. Must be able to swim at least 50 feet stripped, not against time.

4. Must have an Army Physical Fitness Test score of not less than 200 points.

5. Must be of excellent character, no disciplinary actions or investigations pending or appropriate.

6. Students must be qualified as a sharpshooter or better with either the M-1, carbine, automatic rifle, or a first-class gunner with a crew served weapon.

7. They must be assigned to an Infantry unit, intelligence or reconnaissance element of an Infantry airborne or armored unit, or be assigned as a cadreman to a training division or a replacement training center.

8. They can have no less than a minimum of nine months to serve after completion of course.

9. **Officers:** Graduates of Infantry Officer Candidate Course or

graduates of, or credit for, at least the Associate Company Officer Course, The Infantry School, or equivalent.

10. **Officers:** Company grade.

11. **Noncommissioned Officers:** Graduates of Light and Heavy Weapons Infantry Leaders Course or I&R and Operations Chief Course, The Infantry School, or equivalent.

12. **Noncommissioned Officers:** Corporal or above (pending present temporary freeze on promotions, privates first class, if selected).

13. **Noncommissioned Officers:** AGCT or Aptitude Area I score of not less than 90.

The Program of Instruction

Very briefly, the course includes refresher instruction in Infantry weapons, artillery, medical subjects, map reading, intelligence, physical conditioning and hand to hand combat. It also covers stream crossing and field craft, mines, booby traps and demolitions, orientation and survival and tactical training of the individual. The picture is incomplete —until we understand that the student receives formal instruction in leadership as well as the tremendous emphasis that is placed upon practical leadership throughout every phase of the course. All of these

are practiced daily in infiltration problems, patrol problems and various other field exercises.

The primary purpose of the course is to develop leadership of small unit leaders. Extremely valuable tactical knowledge is gained by the students, but the tactical training is a by-product. The vehicle for the leadership training is the patrol, since a patrol is flexible in strength organization and equipment.

The first three weeks of each course are conducted at Fort Benning. There, under the watchful eyes of instructors, students are taught and tested to insure that they possess the necessary professional knowledge to complete the course. In addition there is a strenuous physical training program designed to put the student Ranger in condition to undergo the rigorous physical and mental tests which he will be required to tackle during the remainder of the course.

Following the Benning phase, the class is moved to the thick, reptile-infested swamps and jungles of Florida. There, on the outer fringes of Eglin Air Force Base, the students master jungle survival and amphibious operation. All field exercises (and the students log some 95 hours per week during the 14 days in the jungle) are carefully calculated to force them to traverse long distances through dense forests, swamps and sparsely populated areas. With the exception of a total of **eight** hours devoted to the principles of offense and defense, patrolling techniques and small boat handling, there is no formal instruction during the Florida stay.

It is here that the students cease to receive a training schedule. Striving at all times for realism, the instructors avoid letting the students know what is coming next. When the class assembles for an operation it doesn't know whether the problem will last three hours or three days. The students are on a 50-minute alert at all times except when informed that certain hours will be free.

Students are given orders similar to those issued by a regiment or battalion to a patrol. The patrol missions realistically vary between reconnaissance and combat and may be either for a day or night operation, or both. Working as individuals, the class formulates the organization and equipment of the patrol to include personnel, weapons and special equipment. Next comes organization for security and demolitions, if it is a patrol with a demolition mission, as many of them are. Each man must plan the route, rallying points and select the individual members of the patrol and the jobs to be given each of them. He must decide, from his knowledge of the enemy situation, at what points his patrol is most likely to be hit and any other tentative plans that need to be made. He must plan the action of the patrol at the objective, subsequent rallying points, the route of withdrawal, resupply of ammunition and rations, and the evacuation of the wounded.

No one leans on the instructor. Each student will be called upon during the course to lead from two to five missions. To insure that each man gets his chance it is necessary to conduct up to 20 problems

simultanously in different areas with all the necessary control personnel, transportation, aggressor forces and realism.

After a thorough discussion of the problem at hand a leader is selected to head the group. Instructor-observers go along with the patrol but merely to watch and grade . . . they have strict orders never to interfere with the patrol leader's decisions.

If the patrols get lost — and they sometimes do since they operate over 50-60 miles of uninhabited country — the observer merely takes notes for about one hour after the patrol leader becomes lost. If, at the end of this period the patrol leader is still lost, a new patrol leader is appointed, oriented, and takes command of the patrol at that point.

Phase Three takes the students into the Chattahoochee National Forest in North Georgia near Dahlonega. There again only eight hours of formal instruction is given — in ropes, mountain expedients, mountain traversing and survival. Problems vary in length from 10 to 72 hours. They may require that the units move four miles, or up to 50 miles cross-country through the mountainous terrain. It is an ideal area encompassing 750,000 acres. There are few people, practically no roads, and no telephone poles or railroads. Some get lost; on the other hand the men acquire remarkable ability to go day and night through swamps, jungle, dense forests and mountainous terrain on an azimuth and by maps and aerial photographs by the time they have reached this point.

Buddy System

The buddy system is used throughout the course. When students arrive for the course they constantly hear, "Teamwork, teamwork, teamwork . . ."

Early in the course each man acquires a buddy. From that time on the two work together, study together, play together and live together. If one man is selected to go on a patrol, his buddy goes also. If one man gets 20 extra minutes physical training for a dirty rifle, his buddy does 20 minutes too. The system has worked wonders, especially during the "Courage Tests" which each man must pass to become a Ranger.

Courage Tests

This discussion of courage tests is not written to show the glamorous or unusual aspect of Ranger training — but is included to show commanders that a graduate of the Ranger Course has been carefully screened and skillfully tested before completion of the course.

The courage tests are deliberately designed to inject a certain element of hazard into the course, and to instil a greater degree of self-confidence in the student. These tests do not call for a superman or a Tarzan; but they are something that the average soldier would much prefer to let someone else tackle.

During the courage tests one man may decide that he doesn't care to risk his neck. He falls out. Aware of the man's refusal, an instructor will send that man's buddy over to take him off somewhere and try to get him to change his decision. It can be done by appealing to his self-respect, or any other approach,

but the main goal is to GET HIM TO TAKE THAT TEST! It works in about seven out of ten cases. Furthermore, the system has instituted the beginning of teamwork; it has developed mutual confidence between those particular men; and it has taught each man that as a leader in the Army he can never completely divorce himself from his responsibility for the welfare of other men.

For example, in one test students climb a tree to a height of 29 feet. There they find a log reaching 60 feet across a stream. The men are required to walk across this log. The test involves coordination, agility and confidence. Once across they find a two rope bridge to another tree. They climb up to 36 feet. Here they are required to negotiate the distance by any means they wish. However, at a designated spot they must drop the 36-38 feet into deep water. None get hurt if they follow recognized procedure.

In another courage test rapelling is used. This is the art of transporting men and equipment over high cliffs. The student tries his skill on a 35-foot bluff . . . then over a 90-foot cliff. Most of them quickly acquire the necessary confidence and line up voluntarily to repeat the experience.

Another courage test is the "Death Slide." A death slide is an adaptation of the suspension traverse. This is a technique used in moun-

tain warfare where, by stretching a rope across a chasm or other obstacle from a high bank to a low bank, personnel can quickly move themselves and their equipment. At the mountain camp a death slide has been erected using a steel cable tied to a tree at a point 65 feet above the ground and then stretched across a deep lake to the base of a tree on the far shore. There is a difference of elevation of 85 feet. The students climb a rope ladder to the starting point. At the top they grab a steel pulley to which is attached a standard steel cargo hook. They then release themselves from the tree and slide down the cable attaining a speed of about 30 miles an hour. On a given signal the student releases his grip from the hook and plunges into the lake.

If he drops too soon he will drop about 70 feet into the water. The total time elapsed is between five and six seconds. When he accomplishes these various courage tests, he gains confidence and pride. Finally, between those who have successfully passed all the tests there exists a strong bond; they stick out their chins and carry their heads much higher. These tests quickly separate the men from the boys — that is precisely their purpose.

To date, no student has been injured on any courage test.

Initiative

Remarkable initiative and alertness is displayed by the trainees, especially towards the end of the eight week grind. By this time each of the students has had the book thrown at him on numerous occasions. Instructors who accompany the various patrols often cause the leaders to change their plans by clever preplanned bits of trickery.

One particularly fine display of initiative occurred during the reservoir phase during one cycle. With a 19-year old corporal in charge the patrol had worked its way over snow-covered mountains for two days and had finally sighted its objective — the dam and power plant mentioned earlier. The patrol gathered on the edge of the cold lake, the objective still two miles away.

After taking readings on his position the corporal drew a large map of the lake on the ground, and carefully instructed each man on exactly what he should do. In fact, the corporal made each man go through a dry run of the maneuver twice to make sure that there would be no mistakes.

An accompanying instructor, a lieutenant, carried a radio. He was ordered to call for supporting fire at a designated time. But he also called over to the aggressor forces and let them in on the corporal's plan . . . not enough to foul it up but enough to cause the patrol much difficulty once on its objective. Suspecting that the lieutenant might be an enemy informer, the corporal told the lieutenant to accompany him when it came time to move out. The officer protested and finally was able to slip away from the group.

However, this did not hamper the operation the least bit for the patrol leader simply changed his plans to carry out the mission in a different manner from the original plan. The patrol met no serious opposition once on the objective.

Reports From The Field

The Ranger Department does not forget about its graduates upon their completion of the course. A department observer was detailed to witness Operation Longhorn to determine how well the Ranger trained officers and noncommissioned officers performed. He found commanders at all levels praising the exploits of the Rangers in their units. In one regiment a Ranger-manned patrol went behind enemy lines and returned with a situation map. Moreover, these men were impressed with the interest that had been shown in them and the fact that they had, for the most part, been placed in positions of more responsibility.

One regimental commander stated, "I wish all of my men could attend the course; I now feel that I have nine men who will accept responsibility almost the same as an officer. The other men in their units look up to these men and have confidence in them."

One battalion commander organized a physical training program around the four Rangers in his unit.

Unfortunately, however, it was discovered that in some units the Rangers were not being properly utilized. Little thought had been put into the efficient use of Rangers who had proven their small unit tactical leadership. If the Ranger theory is to accomplish its goal of raising standards throughout the Infantry, commanders must exploit the abilities of these men to the fullest.

When one remembers the stiff prerequisites, it is easy to see that in nearly every case a commander must lose the services of his top-flight company grade officers and his best noncommissioned officers for eight weeks in order to enjoy the benefits of Ranger trained men in his unit. However, compare this against the finished product — a physically fit, alert, intelligent, confident leader — and we find the temporary loss a minor problem.

As Brigadier General Meloy, Assistant Commandant of The Infantry School, recently said: "No commander can afford to underestimate the value of a Ranger trained officer or noncommissioned officer. Once the commander realizes, by seeing a graduate in action, how much he can do to help raise Infantry standards, he will consider the eight weeks of schooling a REAL INVESTMENT. An investment that can be measured tangibly in his own unit."

Meet Sergeant Mulrooney



CAPT. GEORGE TRACY

Barbed wire is an Infantryman's safety factor—when it is used properly. Here's how . . .

"OKAY, MEN. KNOCK OFF, take ten, but keep your eyes open. Come on over here, Carroway, and I'll let you lend me one of those G.I. cigs of yours. I just ran out," grinned platoon sergeant Mulrooney.

Carroway, a veteran of nearly four weeks with Mulrooney's platoon, offered the cigarette and sat down.

When the sergeant had lit up, Carroway looked at him quizzically. "Isn't this a pretty useless job, putting all this wire out? The way we have all those machine guns and AR's set up we should be safe. Besides, these Chinese go right through the wire anyway."

Mulrooney leaned back and took a deep puff on his cigarette. "You're thinking about those stories we got from the third battalion the other day where three Chinese hit one fox hole. Yes — they got in, but I'll bet there was a reason. Don't forget there were only three of them and they didn't get out. Even at that, their job would have been a lot easier if wire hadn't been there. Now and then they'll get through. They're good at it. But they won't generally try it in force unless it's an all-out attack — or maybe about . . ."

"What's that got to do with our wire detail, Sergeant?"

"I'm getting to that, Carroway — I remember once a few months before you got here when we fought all day to take a hill. It was just about dark when we pushed the Chinese off. We spent what daylight there was left setting up our defense and digging in. We had all our machine guns and AR's in good positions with pretty good fields of fire and interlocking sectors of fire. We were bushed but there wasn't much sleeping that night. Those guys started attacking around midnight and kept hitting us until morning.

"The old man had registered the 81's in front of us and a 4.2 FO with us planted some concentrations close in. The 81's and the 4.2's fired so much that night they both set records. The 4.2 fragments clipped branches off the trees over our heads. The Chinese might have come even if we had had wire, but it would have been a lot more difficult for them.

Sergeant Mulrooney is representative of many of the hardworking, experienced, noncommissioned officers on duty in Korea today. He's been in the Army quite a few years now — he's experienced and he draws on this experience to explain the military facts of life to his men. In this article he explains the use of tactical wire.

"A request for wire and mines had already gone in but the next day the old man put a hurry up on the order. Well, we were a good ways up the hill and by the time we got the stuff it was dark. As tired as we were, orders were issued to start putting the wire out. Orders or no orders, no wire was put out that night, either, because we started fighting again and kept at it until daylight. You can bet a month's pay, though, that we started the next day and put up a double apron and lots of mines. We knew we were being watched. We could see the Chinese peeking at us every once in a while. Well, it may have been a coincidence that we didn't get hit that night but I don't think so. I think it was because we had finally had a chance to discourage those guys with some barbed wire."

Pvt. Carroway nodded agreement, adding, "You think it helped?"

"Let's see. You've been with us a month now, Carroway, and most of that time we've been on the move. I don't guess we've used wire since you've been around — but, in any case, you know, yourself, that in these hills no matter how many automatic weapons you have, you can't cover all the draws, noses and gullies well enough. Putting wire where the enemy is most likely to strike and arranging it so that you force him to go where you want him is good insurance against his hitting and overrunning you before you know it. Now take our platoon sector as an example: we have three noses and two draws leading into our position. You've probably noticed that. That's the reason we're putting wire all across our front — protective wire that's in close in addition to the tactical wire out further that lays along our side of the final protective line and forces any attack into the spots where we have either our auto-

matic weapons set up or our barrages planned."

"How about those two gaps we left over there and back aways, Sergeant?" asked Carroway, pointing to a narrow lane through the wire leading into the platoon position."

"They're for our patrols to use to come back through our lines. We'll lay commo wire through the gaps for the patrols to guide on and we'll have to guard them at night."

"How come the third platoon is helping us and isn't putting out its own wire? I heard one of the guys say they weren't going to use any."

"That's right — they're not. If you get a chance, go over to their sector when we're through; you'll see why. You can reach out of one of their fox holes, drop a stone and it will go 400 feet before it hits anything — straight down. It would be sorta foolish to put wire there. No one would try to get in there and, if they did, the wire would probably help them to climb up. That's the reason those guys are helping us."

"Isn't this fence we're putting up called a double apron, Sarge?"

Sgt. Mulrooney had the answers. "Right. And although we're only a little more than half through, we've already got protection. The front apron helps. Those wires that we put straight across on the center pickets — the ones the engineer lieutenant calls the center fence — make a good obstacle. And when we get this rear apron finished, we'll be really well set. Another kind of wire we get sometimes is concertina. That's just about as good when you pile it up in a pyramid and tie it together. In fact some guys like it better that way. A couple of months ago we ran out of ready made concertina and, because the battalion commander liked it better, we sent a couple of details back to battalion to make some concertinas out of regular barbed wire. It's a lot faster to put up because all you have to do is open up the roll and drop it over the stakes. A lot of times the stakes aren't even necessary because so many stumps and small bushes are just about where you want them. It's possible we'll get concertina when we start putting out our second band of wire. Before we're through, we'll have at least three complete bands of wire on the platoon front. We haven't got enough wire up here now to do that but the chiggie bearers are on their way up with another load of wire right now. They'll keep it coming and we'll keep carrying it up on our way back from chow until we have enough.

"Remember I said there must have been some reason for those Chinese getting through the wire?" continued the sergeant. "Well, I can think of quite a few. First of all, the one man who was supposed to have been on guard could have been asleep. I generally rule that one out. The new men stay awake mainly because they're scared and the older ones know better than to sack up. Now when you have a setup like we do in our company — you know, where each squad leader inspects his squad a couple of times a night and the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and the assistant platoon sergeant make the rounds each night — you knock out the chance of a guard falling asleep. Then, of course, there are the old man's sur-

prise visits. You see, Carroway, you can't leave anything to chance."

"Sure, I agree with you, sergeant, but sometimes the Chinese get in even when everyone's awake. Isn't that so?"

"Okay, so it isn't because somebody dozed off. Maybe the wire wasn't covered by fire. You've got to have your fires planned to cover the wire — especially any gaps there might be in it. Take right here, for instance. See how that AR up there on the right can fire down along this part of the wire? See how its sector of fire will cross right over the sector of fire of Martin's machine gun up on the left? You'll notice when we get through that the lieutenant will change some of our sectors of fire a little in order to have somebody responsible for firing along just about every foot of both the tactical and protective wire. *That's a must.* If you can't shoot them when you hear them fooling around on the fence — what good is the wire? Actually what we're doing here is only a small part of the 'big picture.' Back in battalion all of our sectors of fire and final protective line fires will be put together on paper to make sure our whole front is covered. The barrages for the mortars and artillery will be added in to see that the gullies that can't be reached with small arms fire are

eliminated as approaches. It ends up that we'll be behind our own 'iron curtain' of bullets, shrapnel and barbed wire.

"To get back to our own problem, with all these bushes and undergrowth it's possible that some of the men won't be able to cover the wire by fire because they won't be able to see it. That just means the job is only half finished. You have to have a field of fire down to the fence and beyond to do any good. You've got to clear away enough of the bushes and low branches to give you good vision, but not so much that you show the enemy your position. You tell soome guys they have to do that and what do they do? They put the wire right on top of their holes to cut down the work of clearing."

"Yeah! I can see that's not bright," agreed Carroway.

Mulrooney paused for a minute and then broke the silence. "You've probably wondered what I'm doing when you've seen me throw a good size rock at our positions up there every once in a while."

"We've wondered, Sergeant — Why do you do it?"

"Well, I'm not trying to see if anyone is goofing off while we're working. I'm testing the distance. It's my way of finding out whether we're doing this thing right — because you know by now that the distance between wire and fox holes changes with different types of terrain. It has to be close enough so you can fire on it but not close enough for the other guy to be able to toss grenades into your position from the far side of it. The manual says between 30 and 100 yards is a good distance. This hilly country fools me and that's why I toss the rocks as a test."

"Sarge, I see now why this wire is a good thing. I guess if you do everything — just like you've said — the Chinese can't possibly get into our positions."

Mulrooney rubbed the back of his neck thoughtfully. "Not exactly. These Chinese are good at infiltration. It may be that they got through the wire over in the third battalion without being seen or heard. It should never happen — because you sure can prevent a 'sneak up' like that. All sorts of booby traps and alarms can be set up. By rigging up grenades, either frag or illuminating, or trip flares around the wire and in the wire, it makes it mighty hard for anyone to get through without letting us know about it.

"When you use those things you have to be careful. A frag grenade may cut the wire when it goes off, and, even though it gives a warning, it could possibly open a door for the enemy. The illuminating grenades and trip flares not only alert you but put the spotlight on the enemy. As good as they are, there are things to remember about them, too. For instance: last fall, when everything was dry, they started fires. You just have to keep figuring all of the angles."

"What if you don't have all of these fancy gadgets, Sarge?"

Sgt. Mulrooney examined the short, unlit butt in his fingers, "Got another cig?"

"One left. Want to split it?"

Mulrooney ground out his cigarette with the toe of his boot. "Nope! Let's get back to your question. You can use old beer and C ration cans with stones in them to make

good rattles. By tying them on the wire, you've got a good warning system. Now that sounds like just the opposite of what I've told you men about not throwing empty cans down in front of your holes because it gives away your positions. It isn't! There isn't a man in the platoon that would throw cans down there if I said it's okay as long as you camouflage them. Now that's just what we do to these cans or booby traps on the wire. We also camouflage the fence itself.

"It doesn't do any good to camouflage our fox holes and then put a band of silver cans around them at a range of 50 yards or so," said Mulrooney emphatically. "The enemy can see them. With a little effort he can figure out just about where we are.

"Whenever we've been in a spot where the Chinese had us under observation you'll remember that we always moved around on the reverse slope of the hill if we did move for any reason. In a situation like that it's necessary to do all of this work in front of the position at night. Actually, that's part of the camouflage — doing it when he can't see you. That's why you sometimes find that after blasting enemy positions all day long you often find them there again the next day. You see, Carroway, he works at night."

"You know, Sergeant, I guess they told us about this sort of thing in basic training, but here, where it's play for keeps, it sounds different."

"Yes," answered Mulrooney, "I guess it does. Everything I've said adds up to the fact that although it seems like a lot of extra, useless work, this double apron we're putting up now and any others we might have time to build give us just that much more defense.

"It's like in a football game. You've seen a break-away man on a football field stopped by the safety man at the very moment it looked like he was a goner, haven't you, Carroway?"

"Sure have," Carroway replied.

"Like the line of a football team, artillery and mortar concentrations are good and will break up a fair number of enemy plays," Mulrooney went on, "and small arms and machine gun fire, like the line backers, stop their share of the attacks. And in our case, a well-placed barbed wire double apron or pyramided concertina fence, well covered by fire, is similar to the safety man that can break up the attack at the last possible minute."

"And that last minute really counts," agreed Carroway.

"Sure does," Sgt. Mulrooney ended the conversation as he stood up. "Well — we've been shooting the breeze long enough. Okay, men — let's get going on the wire."

Publication of this article should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting the thought of The Infantry School or the Infantry School *Quarterly*.

Meet the Authors

Captain John Hughes, author of "A Combat Captain Speaks," served as a platoon leader in the 11th Airborne Division during World War II. He commanded a company in Korea until mid-1951 when he returned to the United States to enter the Advanced Course at The Infantry School. He is currently an instructor in the Tactical Department, TIS.

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Captain Don E. Humphries was graduated from OCS in 1943 and served in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns with the 32d Infantry, 7th Division. He is assigned to the Weapons Department of The Infantry School.

General J. Lawton Collins was graduated from the United States Military Academy in April 1917. He served with the American Forces in Germany from 1919 until 1921. He was graduated from courses at The Infantry School and served as an instructor at TIS from 1927 until 1929. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, the Army Industrial College and the Army War College. He became an instructor at the Army War College upon graduation in 1938 and served in that capacity until 1940.

General Collins' early World War II assignments included tours as Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department (immediately after Pearl Harbor) and command of the 25th Division in the campaigns of Guadalcanal, New Georgia and Valla Lavella. In December 1943 General Collins was transferred to the European Theater where, in February 1944, he was made commander of VII Corps.

General Collins' postwar assignments have included tours as Director of Information and Chief of Staff, United States Army.

Colonel Gines Perez, author of "On Top of the Ridge Line," served in the Southwest Pacific with the 1st Cavalry Division during World War II. In Korea he commanded the 21st Infantry, 24th Division. His present assignment is G3 of The Infantry Center, Fort Benning.

Lt David R. Hughes was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1950 and was ordered to Korea that fall. While there he commanded Company "K" of the 7th Cavalry and served in several staff assignments. Upon his return to the United States he was assigned to The Infantry School as an instructor in the Tactical Department.

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Captain George Tracy, author of "Meet Sergeant Mulrooney," was graduated from West Point in 1949 and from The Infantry School in 1950. In Korea he served as a rifle company commander in the 17th Infantry and, later, in the G3 section of X Corps headquarters. He is presently assigned as an instructor in the Weapons Department of The Infantry School.

Lt Joseph Windsor is now Mister Windsor of the Columbus (Georgia) Chamber of Commerce. He gathered the material for "Rugged and Ready" while serving in the Public Information Office at Fort Benning just prior to his release from active duty last year. Lt Windsor served in Europe with the 9th Armored Division during World War II. He is a graduate of the University of Missouri and was night editor of the Associated Press in Nashville, Tennessee, before reentering the Army.

Major John J. Morgan, author of "The New 81-mm Mortar," is now assigned to Army Field Forces Board No. 3 at Fort Benning. His combat service includes tours of duty with the 274th Infantry in Europe during World War II and with the 15th Infantry in Korea.

Captain Alfred Phillips graduated from the Infantry OCS in January 1944. He served as rifle platoon leader and rifle company commander in the 86th Division in both the European and Pacific theaters during 1945 and 1946. Captain Phillips re-entered active duty in March 1950 and is currently assigned to The Infantry School as principal instructor of The School's Combat in Cities Problem.

Captain Ralph T. Tierno, author of "That You May Live," was graduated from West Point in 1945. After graduation he was assigned to the 97th Division in the Pacific. From 1948 to 3 December 1950, he served with the 7th RCT, 3d Division in Massachusetts and Korea. He is now assigned to The Infantry School as an instructor in counterintelligence.

Major Quinton L. Gates, author of "The New Counterfire Platoon," was commissioned in 1941 and served with the 45th Division in the Mediterranean Theater during World War II. In 1945 he attended the Joint Army-Navy Communications Course at Harvard University. He is currently assigned to the Communications Department of The Infantry School.

We regret to report that the author of "They Called It Ingenuity," **Lt Myrth J. Killingsworth,** was killed in action in Korea on 14 October 1952.

Captain Daniel W. Halladay, author of "Attention Commanders," is a graduate of Pomona College, Pomona, California. During World War II he served as a rifle company commander in the 83d Division. Prior to his recall to active duty he was an Associate Professor of Education at the University of Florida. He is now an instructor in the Staff Department of The Infantry School.

Colonel N. J. Wiley, Jr., author of "Keep It Simple," was graduated from West Point in 1928. During World War II he served in the South Pacific as Military Adviser to the Commander of the Fifth US Fleet in the operations directed against Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Japan. Colonel Wiley was Public Information Officer for the Eighth Army in Korea from September 1950 until September 1951, at which time he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces as Public Information Officer.

Lt William C. Kimball wrote "We Need Intelligence and **Raider** Platoons" in Japan after his regiment, the 21st Infantry, was rotated out of the Korean fighting last year. Lt Kimball was graduated from the Officer Candidate School at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1950.

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
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